Daily Report

East Europe

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6 August 1996

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-152 *6 August 1996*

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Albania: Rugova Welcomes U.S Congress Resolution

AU0608075996 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 3 Aug 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by D. Gashi on news conference by Ibrahim Rugova, "president of the Republic of Kosova," in Pristina on 2 August: "The U.S. Congress Resolution Supports Self-Determination for Kosova"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, began yesterday's news conference by welcoming the U.S. Congress resolution on Kosova, which asks for an improvement of the situation in Kosova, self-determination for Kosova, and the appointment of a special U.S. envoy for Kosova. President Rugova thanked Kosova's friends in the U.S. Congress who backed this resolution, led by Mr. Engel and Mrs. Molinari, cochairmen of the Committee for the Question of Kosova. He also welcomed the stand taken by Secretary of State Christopher in front of the Congress Foreign Relations Committee, according to which "The Albanians must manage Kosova." Dr. Rugova thanked Mr. Christopher for his personal commitment to Kosova and for the pleasure he had expressed at the opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina. [passage omitted]

Commenting on the Serbian law on citizenship, which, as one correspondent remarked, prevents Albanians from returning to their own homes in Kosova, Dr. Rugova said, "Our citizenship is well known, and as for the citizenship offered by this artificial creation, it is of no use to us in Kosova but is only being imposed by force." Regarding the idea that Kosova might issue its own citizenship law, Dr. Rugova said that "We have not embarked on many issues that would exacerbate the situation. However, it is important that Kosova, at the state level, is increasingly being recognized as an international entity."

President Rugova again asked Macedonian President Gligorov to use his authority to release the leaders of Tetovo University and not to convict them, in order not to exacerbate the situation in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. He also asked for the legalization of the work of Tetovo University and asked for the Albanians to cooperate more among themselves. "As you know," President Rugova said, "we are making efforts to have good relations with Macedonia and to ensure that the Albanians there exercise all their rights." [passage omitted]

Albania: Rugova 'Closer to Reality' on Kosova Independence

AU0608081296 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 4 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Gavrosh Levonja: "Rugova Closer to Reality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosova Albanians, did not omit to welcome, at his regular news conference last Friday [2 Aug], the position on Kosova articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Considering the contents of the secretary of state's declaration, one can notice that something has changed and may be made public regarding the stands taken by Mr. Rugova and the Kosova Democratic League [LDK] over a settlement of the Kosova issue and the steps that it is thought will lead to this. This is despite the fact that Rugova repeated once again the standard formulas about a Kosova independent of Serbia.

Mr. Christopher, in his report to the legislators of the U.S. Congress, in connection with Kosova expressed his pleasure at the U.S. office in Kosova, and mentioned that the main goal of U.S. diplomacy, as far as the status of the Albanians in Kosova is concerned, is to improve their conditions of life and to achieve a greater degree of autonomy that would enable the Albanians to control and manage their own lives. In pursuit of these objectives, Christopher pledged that the United States will not be backward in exerting pressure on Serbian President Milosevic.

As is clear, the head of the State Department made no mention of an independent and neutral Kosova, open to Serbia and Albania, the idea which has been the guiding light of LDK policy on the basis of a boycott of all levels of the Serbian regime. It has been this very option of the Albanians for an independent Kosova, which is categorically opposed by all Serbian political circles, that has been one of the main factors preventing the start of dialogue between the Albanian representatives of Kosova and the Belgrade government. Thus, welcoming a stand that mentions only "a greater degree of autonomy" means that Rugova is no longer a fanatical adherent of the theory of an independent Kosova, at least for the moment. The Albanian leader now sees that no political circles of weight in the international arena conceive a solution of the issue of Kosova beyond the bounds of autonomy, something for which they are exerting pressure on Belgrade.

The urgent need to find a solution within such parameters does not exclude the use of pressure also on those who refuse or fail to contribute toward putting an end to

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the crisis of Kosova, even by removing them from the positions they hold. In this sense, the involvement in political life of such names as Demaci, Bakalli, and Vllasi, who admit more moderate options than independence for Kosova, is significant. Moreover, as a result of five years of fruitless passive resistance, Rugova's popularity in the eyes of the Albanians has visibly waned. These factors, alongside fear of losing the privilege of being a main performer in the talks with Belgrade, which show every sign of being about to start very soon, have led Rugova to take the side of realism.

Another reason preventing the Albanians and the Serbs from sitting down at a table to solve their disagreements has been the method of conducting the talks. The Serbs do not agree to the variant of "mediation by a third party," a condition laid down by the Albanians. The U.S. secretary of state, although expressing pessimism over the role of a special U.S. envoy, i.e. the presence of a third party, expressed enthusiasm over the effects of the contacts of himself and other U.S. officials with Milosevic. "These are the people to whom this person must give most attention in connection with the issue of Kosova," Christopher said in reply to those asking for the appointment of a special envoy. In fact, Serbian President Milosevic expressed his readiness to talk to Dr. Ibrahim Rugova only a short time ago, at his meeting with the Republican congressman Eliot Engel.

If Rugova's welcome for the stand expressed by Christopher bears any connection to this, it means that he no longer intends to defend his previous formula of talks involving a third party. This again is a sign of realism, because it would be difficult to find a more successful mediator than the secretary of state of the world's only superpower. In fact, the United States has quietly assumed this role since the talks at Dayton at the end of last year, when the Americans touched on the issue of Kosova with Milosevic. Perhaps the recent chill between Tirana and Washington could make a mediating mission undertaken by Christopher and other U.S. officials all the more acceptable to Belgrade.

Albania: Tirana Court Judges Charged With 'Corruption'

AU0208143996 Tirana ATA in English 0956 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 2 (ATA)—A motion, regarding corruption which is thought to be present in Tirana Law Court, has reached the office of the Director of Personnel in the Albanian Ministry of Justice, newspaper ALBANIA writes Thursday [1 August].

The motion signed by judges, nominated after 1992, charge judges who have exercised their profession even before 1992, as authors of many problems in the Albanian law courts.

Sources from Tirana Court, cited by ALBANIA, say that the division between judges, nominated before and after 1992, was result of problems and different stands the judges hold while trying different judicial cases.

Judges nominated after 1992, in their motion give the authorship of the corruption in the court to judges who have a longer working experience, writes ALBANIA, after clarifying that the motion is discussed for two months in Tirana Court.

Albania: Deputies Approve Amendment to Local Government Law

AU0108171696 Tirana ATA in English 1030 GMT 1 Aug 96

[Report by A. Sakja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 31 (ATA)—The Albanian Parliament, on its session Wednesday [31 July], approved the draft law on an amendment of the law "On the Organisation and Functioning of Local Government."

It was issued by the State Secretariat of Local Government aiming an easier functioning of its administration and avoiding its incompatibility with the law.

This law eliminates a contradiction which lately made the Constitutional Court to declare anti-constitutional the last line of the law which said: "In case, the council of the district fails to elect its chairman, Council of Ministers dissolves the council and nominates a delegate to make the administration function according to provisions of this law."

This problem came into evidence when the Council of Ministers dissolved the council of the Kukes district.

Albania: Anticommunist Group Protests Appeals Ruling of Court

AU0508131396 Tirana ATA in English 1041 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 5 (ATA)-The Anticommunist Association of the Formerly Politically Persecuted Democrats protests against a decision of the Appeals Court saying: "No tolerance for communist criminals." The protest has to do with the decision of July 24, 1996 on five persons responsible for the internal exile crime during communist dictatorship considered by our laws a crime against humanity.

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"The unexpected decision of the Appeals Court to release Haxhi Lleshi and Manush Myftiu on probation, after the Tirana Court had sentenced them to life imprisonment, and to revoke death sentences in Aranit Cela, Rrapi Mino and Zylyftar Ramizi, whom the Tirana Court had sentenced to life imprisonment, is an open challenge by certain segments of Albanian justice to the implementation of the enforced laws," the protest says.

The presidency of the association expresses its concern and protests against "this absurd situation created at various levels of the Albanian courts, which consider the same crime from one extreme to the other." This fact is of greater concern when having to do with verdicts on persons directly responsible for crimes against innocent people," the protest says. "We protest against the commuted sentences levelled against five chiefs of communist genocide in Albania and are convinced they will be reexamined by our courts' high level bodies. This will serve the strengthening of the democratic order in Albania and be a very meaningful indication of the Albanian justice," the protest concludes.

Haxhi Lleshi, former chairman of the People Assembly, Manush Myftiu, former deputy Prime Minister and chairman of the Internal exile Central Commission, Aranit Cela, former chairman of the Supreme Court and member of the commission, Rrapi Mino, former Attorney General and member of the commission, Zylyftar Ramizi, foermer deputy minister of the Interior, High internal exile Central Commission, denounced by the Independent Intellectuals Forum, were accused of crimes against humanity in complicity.

Albania: Daily Welcomes Decision To Open Greek Schools

AU0608121996 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 6 Aug 96 p 3

[Commentary by Hamdi Jupe: "Belated Decision by the Albanian Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Albanian Government decided yesterday to start classes in their mother tongue for children of the Greek minority living in the towns of Gjirokaster, Sarande, and Delvine. This is a welcome decision not only for the Greek minority population in Albania, but for the entire democratic Albanian public. With the opening of these classes, the children of the Greek minority population in these towns will have the opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue in the towns where they live, a right that has long been their due.

The Albanian Government's latest decision to start these classes is long overdue. The children of the Greek minority in these towns first started classes in their mother tongue in 1991, during the time of the Stability Government. The Democratic Party [PD] Government closed them down immediately after its assumption of power in 1992 and refused to allow them to reopen during its four years in government. This stand taken by the Albanian Government led to protests among the minority population of the districts concerned and also to embittered relations between Greece and Albania. The government covered up its stand on closing these classes with the half-baked measure of sending the town-dwelling children of the minority to schools in the surrounding villages. Another half-hearted measure of the Albanian Government was to permit private schools, but not state schools for the Greek minority children in these towns. This was a sign of a dilettante and insincere policy by the PD government toward these children's right to education in their mother tongue in the places where they live.

By its most recent decision, the Albanian Government has redressed its earlier attitude. This is a positive step. However, the rights of the Greek minority in Albania must not become the prey of political opportunism in Albania and of our country's relations with Greece. We say this because the present decision by the Albanian Government comes immediately after the political crisis created by the 26 May elections and the meeting two days ago between PD Chairman Tritan Shehu and Human Rights Union [PBDNj] Chairman Vasil Melo. Commenting of the decision to start Greek-language classes in the southern towns, PBDNj Chairman Melo said to the BBC yesterday that, "after this decision, I believe the two PBDNj deputies will join the parliament."

This statement by Melo seriously compromises the recent decision by the Albanian Government and casts doubt on its sincerity in starting Greek-language classes. It shows that the decision came not as a result of a proper understanding of what is due to the children of the Greek minority, but out of an attempt to bargain with the PBDNj deputies, in order to attract them into the parliament.

Anyway, let us for the moment congratulate the children of the minority in these towns and wish them every success in their classes in their mother tongue, which will start in the new school year.

Albania: Ministers Pass Decisions on Education, Economy

AU0608112596 Tirana ATA in English 1800 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 5 (ATA)—In its today's meeting, the Council of Ministers passed two important decisions in the field of education. The first

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decision is related with the eight form education in the mother tongue of the national minorities. Its aim is a greater possibility for education in the mother tongue of the children of the Greek minority in the cities of Saranda, Delvina and Gjirokastra.

The decision was presented to the Council of Ministers by the Ministry of Education and Sports right after the talks on this issue between the presidents Berisha and Stephanopoulos in their latest meeting in Tirana.

The second decision has to do with an amendment to the decision on admissions to students in the university during 1996-1997 school year which envisages that the procedures of competition for the admission of the students from the territories outside the country's borders be made in the universities or other higher schools in the Republic of Albania.

The Council of Ministers also adopted an amendment to the law on the levies for the small business. It suggests a reclassification of the small business activities for the account of taxes. The Council of Ministers also passed the following laws: "On an amendment to the law on the profits tax" which envisages that all local and foreign subjects that will start their activity in the territory of the Republic of Albania, will have a lower profit tax for a period up to two years from the beginning of the activity.

The meeting also passed the law "On the ratification of the agreement on technical cooperation in the field of mining search" between the Mining and Metal Agency of Japan and the Ministry of Mining and Energy Sources of Geoalba.

The Council of Ministers adopted some decisions on the organization of the work for Albania's membership in the World Trade Organization, for the adoption in principle of the financing of credits by the European Bank of Investments for the project 220 KW substation in Vlora and the 220 KW line in Vlore-Fier to the tune of 12 million ECU, for the changing of the transportation tariffs for passengers which envisages that beginning with September 1st, the tariffs of urban transport in the lines up to 9 km long become 10 lek, and higher railway transportation tariffs.

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Bulgaria: Zhelev Views President's Prerogatives, Election

AU0508124596 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 5 Aug 96 p 9

[Interview with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev by Rumyana Bratovanova; place and date not given: "Zhelyu Zhelev: I Have No Reserve Trump Card Up My Sleeve"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bratovanova] Today is the fifth day of the seventh year of your presidency. Where are we now, after your election as president on 1 August 1990?

[Zhelev] Unfortunately, not where we should have been. We started together with the countries of the Visegrad Three and, until 1993, we advanced together with them. Afterward, we gradually began to fall behind and found ourselves in Romania's group. Recently, even Romania has pulled ahead of us. The very fact that our country is in the midst of such a grave crisis seven years after the changes implies that something has gone wrong.

[Bratovanova] What is the reason?

[Zhelev] The form of the state system, vested in the Constitution is the main reason for Bulgaria's great lag.

[Bratovanova] You have been accused of striving toward more power because of such ideas....

[Zhelev] This is not serious. By not adopting a different state structure, we made a crude mistake. The republican model vested in the Constitution proved that it does not function or functions poorly. Whoever took the helm in his hands could not change the results much. It is like a car. If it is faulty, then it makes no difference who is the driver. It will not go any better. I think that the "engine" must be replaced. I see no other solution.

[Bratovanova] Why are you raising the issue only now?

[Zhelev] I expressed my opinion already when the relevant part of the Constitution was composed at the beginning of 1991. It was already decided that the president will be elected by the people. Then the parliamentary faction of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], which had the absolute majority in the Grand National Assembly, invited me, in my capacity as president, to share my views on the prerogatives of the head of state. I told them that the head of state should have great prerogatives because we have yet to enter the period of transition, which would be accompanied by great economic, social, and political tension, and also because we are situated in the Balkans, an especially volatile region from a political point of view, where all sorts of surprises might be expected. Unfortunately, my position was not taken into consideration. [passage omitted]

[Bratovanova] After signing the Warsaw Pact's death act, where do you see the guarantees for our country's security? NATO, for example?

[Zhelev] Unfortunately, at present, we are the most far-removed country from NATO among the former socialist countries. This is mostly a result of the BSP rule. This is almost fatal for our national security because Bulgaria is like a hole in the already emerging collective security system in Europe. I even begin to think that we will enter NATO after Russia. Let us hope that Russia will not have to liberate us again, this time from communism. [passage omitted]

[Bratovanova] Do you feel yourself a victim of the united opposition?

[Zhelev] This is a very personal question. It is more important that my gesture is understood and utilized for democratic purposes.

[Bratovanova] Will you reveal the truth after the presidential elections?

[Zhelev] Leave this... for the time being. However, illusions and lies must not remain a part of politics. Everything must be fully spoken in the open. the truth purifies and protects against mistakes.

[Bratovanova] I have the impression that you are hiding a trump card up your sleeve.

[Zhelev] Only reality can reveal what is up sleeves. I declare again that I will not run in the presidential elections, because I have committed myself to this. However, the agreement is binding on me only until 27 October. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Opposition to Kostov Within SDS Analyzed

AU0508155596 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 1-7 Aug 96 No 30, pp 10-12

[Article by Tatyana Vasileva: "Palace Revolution Within the SDS?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Somewhat irritatingly, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] is starting to repeat its old mistakes. Now that the time has come for it to assume power, the fearful shadow of disintegration is appearing over the blue coalition. The name of Filip Dimitrov has already been connected once with the conflict with Zhelev in 1992, which proved fatal for the SDS. Now the former prime minister stands against Ivan Kostov. At a time when the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] cabinet has evidently failed in its administration and the SDS

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should be uniting to seize power, the union is again riven by conflicts of ideas.

The facts are simple: The new SDS leadership, with Kostov at its head, wants to establish a new style and a new program. On the other hand, the veterans surrounding Filip Dimitrov are irritated when the people in SDS headquarters fail to take careful heed of their experiences in the battle against communism. It is precisely here, between the new SDS leaders and the old ones, who by inertia are still referred to as the "backstabbers," that a conflict looms with potentially fatal consequences for the SDS. For the time being, the conflict is masked as a debate within the SDS, but in fact it bears the signs of an attempt at a palace revolution. If, after assuming the new image and announcing the new beginning, the blue coalition also acquires a new program, this will mean the end of the era of the "backstabbers." Then, the whole of the Second Attorneys' Office [SDS lawyers in National Assembly who supported Dimitrov] will have to stand in line and share Zhelev's unhappy fate.

The attacks now being launched by the "backstabbers" bear a suspicious resemblance to the demands they made in the past, when the old leadership was replaced. Again there is talk about a brains trust, again tension is being created between the National Coordinating Council and the National Executive Council, and guarantees are being sought that Filip Dimitrov's people will not fall from power. The new element is the "shadow cabinet," which in fact is nothing other than the old theme, now well forgotten, of who is to control whom within the SDS.

Kostov seized power in velvet gloves. For almost two years, the former finance minister was considered for Filip Dimitrov's successor, but only became leader at the Seventh SDS National Conference in May 1995. This was the first time that a leader of the coalition was elected at such a representative forum, instead of within the narrow circle of the National Coordinating Council. For this reason, the "backstabbers" feared that Kostov might exploit his position of absolute leader, show them the door, and then surround himself with completely new people.

The leadership shuffle ostensibly ended without victors or losers. Kostov posed for the cameras with a bunch of blue irises, while the mysterious smile on the face of Filip Dimitrov, standing behind him, was supposed to indicate that the two of them had agreed to share power: One of them was to assume the SDS leadership, with all its assets and liabilities, while the other was to withdraw to the "Demokratsiya" Foundation to work on the coalition's strategy.

Kostov declared that the SDS was now "nonspontaneous and nonrevolutionary," and threw himself into constructing a new image for the union. His formula for this was to establish the coalition as a national political force, not a right-wing one. Strong figures like Petur Stoyanov and Aleksandur Bozhkov were added to his team, Vasil Gotsev took over foreign policy issues, and Nadezhda Mikhaylova assumed responsibility for information policy. At first sight, the forces were equally divided between the new and old faces in the SDS, but when everyone sided with Kostov, the "backstabbers" sensed that they were losing ground.

Three camps in the SDS. The establishment of the SDS's new structure led to a redistribution and new delineation of territories within the National Coordinating Council. Three camps were formed. The first was the camp of Kostov and the new political pragmatists; the second was that of Ivan Kurtev and his allies; and the third consisted of Vasil Mikhaylov's rebels and the small parties in the SDS that had not acquired duplicates.

The "backstabbers" did not join any of the three camps, nor did they unreservedly support Kostov's new line. The SDS leader became suspicious of Filip Dimitrov, but his big worry was Ivan Kurtev, who continued to control part of the SDS apparatus. The leader of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] gave no sign that he was planning revenge, but occupied himself solely with his deputy chairmanship of the SDS Parliamentary Group.

Nevertheless, Ivan Kurtev attempted the first attack on Kostov, during the Seventh SDS National Conference. The former chief secretary of the SDS called for an amendment of the SDS Statute, giving the right to the conference delegates to relieve the new chairman and leaders from the National Coordinating Council. This was an attempt to provide advance protection against the eventuality of Kostov becoming a dictator. The proposal was rejected.

The second unsuccessful attack came from Filip Dimitrov himself. He proposed increasing the number of Kostov's deputies to enable them to counteract the leader's overambitious initiatives by a majority vote. In the new SDS structure, the National Executive Council was envisioned as an SDS executive leadership body under the control of the National Coordinating Council. However, this proposal also failed, because, if it had been passed, the "backstabbers" would have lost the ability to take the citadel of power by storm from their fortress in the National Coordinating Council.

The third attack was contained in the draft resolution submitted by Ecoglasnost on setting up a strategic planning center attached to the National Coordinating

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Council. The head of the center would be a member of the National Executive Council by right and be elected by the National Coordinating Council, Edvin Sugarev wrote in his proposal. In fact, this was a plan to return the former SDS leader to power, since no one was more qualified than Filip Dimitrov to head the strategic center. This brains trust was to develop the SDS's strategy, while Kostov was to implement it. Filip Dimitrov wanted to be something like an SDS "Lilov," a figure whom everyone had to take into account, while his successor Kostov was to be his obedient adjutant. However, regarding the strategic centerm, the conference only reached an agreement in principle, and no decision was made on actually setting it up.

Victor, but for how long? Having managed to escape from all these attempts to impose control, Kostov began to establish his mastery over the SDS. He proceeded slowly and gradually, but when he entered someone's territory, he always ended with capturing it completely. Apparently, he has not come into confrontation with the "backstabbers," but seems to have managed to isolate them in their own circle. New politicians appeared at SDS headquarters who swept away the Second Attorneys' Office, and soon Filip Dimitrov felt like a colossus with feet of clay.

The former leader's reserves of power were extremely limited: In the National Assembly, he was merely a rank-and-file deputy, and he did not dare to raise his head, since he had renounced power of his own volition. Kostov had no need of advice, and gradually drew away from both the revolutionary fanaticism of Edvin Sugarev and the revolutionary enthusiasm of Pavel Shopov. With their demise, the fear of a "clean past" [proposal to make public secret files on National Assembly deputies kept by Zhivkov regime] and the bitter taste of mutual insults also disappeared.

Kostov executed brilliantly the operation of "union with all democratic forces" and reaped the fruits of Petur Stoyanov's victory in the opposition's presidential primaries. On 1 June, the united opposition was legitimized as a national political force.

So far, the "backstabbers" have been the losers, but their chance of revenge is coming with the likelihood of the SDS forming a government. In a certain sense, this may also be the last battle between the old and the new leadership. Making a final effort, Filip Dimitrov's people are making a move simultaneously on three fronts: amending the SDS Statute to limit Kostov's power; immediately forming a "shadow cabinet" to reallocate the roles at SDS headquarters; and defending the SDS program of 1994, to rehabilitate the line followed by the Second Attorneys' Office. Will they succeed?

Bulgaria: Electronics Firm Head Discusses Neva Project

AU0208144796 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 22 Jul 96 p 16

[Interview with Biser Dimitrov, president of the Giga Storage Company, by special correspondent Svetlana Popova in Belfort, France; date not given: "Perestroyka Saved the Players in the Secret Neva Project"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Biser Dimitrov has been engaged in the electronics business since 1970. He was a director of the Periferna Tekhnika [Peripheral Equipment] Company in Plovdiv and served one year in a Bulgarian prison for financial malpractice. General Georgi Manchev (retired), the last director of Bulgarian scientific and technical intelligence, claims that the trial was an operation mounted by Bulgarian counterintelligence. Since 1990, Dimitrov has been living in the United States and is engaged in business in three continents in the high technologies field. His name is linked with both the KGB and the CIA. At the start of this year he was arrested in France on suspicion of money laundering. At the moment he is developing his new company in Belfort, which manufactures hard discs with a storage capacity of 1.08 gigabytes.

[Popova] Mr. Dimitrov, you have the self-confident air of a successful man.

[Dimitrov] You feel very good when you manage to score goals everywhere. In fact, according to business theory, we should not exist, but this is what gives me kicks, to achieve the impossible. It sounds like a joke—for East Europe to make investments in business in France!

[Popova] The two banks that are shareholders in Giga Storage have often attracted the interest of journalists. A lot has been written in Bulgaria about Kredit und Wechsel Bank, but what about the second bank, NFT, which owns 27.68 percent of the shares?

[Dimitrov] Andras Patko is a former Hungarian finance minister, and he formed NFT in New York. The firm deals in investment finance. I ran across him in 1994, when I was seeking money and touring the East and the West for this purpose (it is difficult to find money in the West for disc memory devices, while the East has no money). He understands such high-risk projects and, being a New Yorker and a Jew, he quickly grasped the picture. This is his most successful investment. At the moment, our company is estimated to be worth $100 million, but its potential value, which we expect to reach

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next year, is $1 billion. When we achieve this, we will go public, on the stock market. People will make a lot of money out of us, and we will make a lot of money too. No one has such a product, and the trick is to be the first. Others will bring similar products onto the market, but nine months later.

[Popova] There has been talk about Giga Storage increasing its capital. How will this be carried out?

[Dimitrov] In any event, it will not be through devaluing our shares. We pull the strings, and will not permit any devaluation. Quite the contrary, we can say goodbye to everyone and choose an even better solution. Our shareholdings, which belong to the people who are implementing the project, cannot be devalued. As for the others, let the investors reach agreement among themselves. We are selling a product, so they should give us money. If they do not want to, there are others with a lot of money who are just waiting for such a chance. This is not the important problem for us. Our concern was to create a product, put it on the market, produce the first few thousand units, and get the clients' assessments, because the first few thousand are the most difficult to produce.

[Popova] If you do not need the people who have invested in your company until now, who are you and who are they, and when did you decide that you do not need them any more?

[Dimitrov] The point is that a project like Giga Storage goes through various stages. In the first stage, you need so-called gray money—$0.5 to 1 million to develop the ideology. I did this with German partners, [Author's note: In Giga Storage, Biser Dimitrov and two German industrialists, Winfred Fischer and Karl Volker, each hold 5.70 percent of the shares.] together with Multigroup. The second stage comes when you have to invest $5 to 10 million to develop the product. The third is when you need $25 million to go into production. Accordingly, we needed $40 to 50 million to launch the disc-manufacturing project. Now, one needs $100 million. This is why I say we do not need anyone—it is a question of big money. At these high stakes, so-called sophisticated investors may take part with their big money, whereas our present partners do not fall in this category. However, Kredit und Wechsel Bank understands more about the disc business than anyone else, because it was engaged in servicing the Neva project, which is well known in Bulgaria. Now, however, investors from the Far East who know what is at stake have to come in, and they have already staked $50 to 60 million. They understand that you have to put in $100 million to make $1 billion. They know that billions are not made out of 1 million. They also appreciate the risks of such projects and accept them. However, we will also continue with our present partners.

[Popova] There has been a lot of comment in Bulgaria about your relations with Multigroup. Please explain the picture.

[Dimitrov] Multigroup was supposed to invest $2.6 million in our game, but, at the time, it was able to make a lot more in other business ventures with this amount of money. According to what I know about Multigroup, it is an organization that seeks an immediate cash return, while, with us, the investment is for the long term. In our branch, investments start to produce profits in two or three years. That is why they withdrew. With Multigroup, we started out normally—they were our investors. Later, they changed their plans, and we gave them their investment back. They had also promised lines of credit, but subsequently decided that they would retain them for other activities. Thus, we parted company, and each went his own way. However, this is quite normal behavior in business, it is a matter of a chosen strategy. Accordingly, there is no reason for our relations to be strained. I like Iliya Pavlov very much personally. Once a man has made a success, let him go on. The important thing is whether you can do it or not, and he has proved that he can.

[Popova] How did your relations with Multigroup become a matter for judicial investigation?

[Dimitrov] I have never managed to understand why the investigators asked me whether I managed Multitronics. I have never managed this concern. I was supposed to manage it jointly with Iliya Pavlov, but the situation changed, our assessments differed on how quickly the money had to circulate, so we parted company. I believe that my brother-in-law, Plamen Vachkov, is one of the directors of Multitronics, but I have no points of contact with them. However, now an immense problem has developed in France out of this. I do not know who had a need for me to prove to the investigators that my brother-in-law in Bulgaria is not a Russian mafia boss and for us to discuss the origin of the money!

[Popova] You explained to the court that one reason why you parted company with Multigroup was the need for the company to be transparent. Does this mean that a Bulgarian corporation is not sufficiently transparent?

[Dimitrov] It is well known that Multigroup is registered in Switzerland and operates in Bulgaria. Its transparency is its own business—it is a private company, and no one can look into its backyard from outside. We, however, are extremely vulnerable because of the specifics of the disc business. Everyone in the branch knows who is who, what he can do, and what the others are doing.

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For this reason, everything has to be clearly visible. We plan to bring the company onto the public market. When shares in disc companies are sold on the New York Stock Exchange, registrations in Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man, and other such devices, which are quite normal business practice, do not sound appropriate when one is trying to launch the company on the stock market.

[Popova] The last chief of Bulgarian scientific and technical intelligence, Gen. Georgi Manchev (retired), told us recently in a conversation that you never participated in the Neva project for transferring embargoed technologies when Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] was in existence. How then has it come about that the main players in the Neva project have gathered around you?

[Dimitrov] Georgi Manchev is quite right about Neva. I never played any part in the project. The only player from the Neva project is Ognyan Bozarov (Author's note: former chief of BTD Insist, used as an intermediary for the Neva operations). Second, Ognyan Bozarov knows his Russian partners. They are disc specialists who lost a lot through this business and want to achieve something at any cost. In their view, a small production operation, such as the assembly of our product, which is advantageous for us, will decide the fate of the Russian market.

[Popova] Informed people claim that you are the man who brought the first robots into Bulgaria.

[Dimitrov] I did not bring them all in. That was my job in scientific and technical intelligence. I was the foreign trade specialist who dealt with this. Everyone knows about our group; we operated in the United States in 1975, 1976, and 1977. Later on, many people jumped onto this bandwagon, when robotics became a modern concept in Bulgaria. However, I learned an immense amount about the subject at that time. I was young, 20 years old, when I first appeared in the United States. There were 14 of us, and we bought licenses for robots.

[Popova] You were buying licenses even then?

[Dimitrov] Yes, full licenses. Sometimes we also stole specimens, whatever we could get hold of, and copied them, but it did not concern technologies whose export was banned. We had an export permit for every item. Incidentally, then, many products could be taken abroad with export permits, and this was my thesis, which led me to consider another thesis, namely to take them without permission, because, at that time, such activities had an air of glamour. Accordingly, the price went up—for our client Russia. How complicated it is to do business with bad people! The Cold War helped Bulgaria a lot.

[Popova] Do you claim that this is the true story about the heroes of the Neva project and the whole period when the Cocom restrictions were in force?

[Dimitrov] Yes. It was necessary to make a show and for there to be many heroes, so as to drive up the price. This was true of most of them. However, some people really did deal in high technologies. Ogi (Author's note: Ognyan Bozarov) was a specialist in this field. He and I were friends, but we never swapped the blue file for the red one. He is a good businessman. However, in the Neva project, they played like big fish. The technologies that were transferred should certainly not have gone there. However, it is a good thing that the USSR disintegrated and that they collected their money in time. Now they are all heroes. In the Neva project, the commercial operation was a success, but it was hardly successful from the technology viewpoint. In 1990, to produce a 20-megabyte storage device meant to take the lead in the world. The Russians are also slow, and both sides have a stake in ensuring that Russia sees no benefit from the Neva project.

[Popova] The Jew Chaim Klein surfaced recently from the old Neva affair, and people started talking again about the future of DZU [Disc Memory Devices Plant in Stara Zagora, Bulgaria].

[Dimitrov] I know Klein from Keylock (Author's note: a disc development company in California that has gone bankrupt). Our German partners introduced me to him. We established that he was a distinguished operator in the Bulgarian special services. We may not have liked each other very much, but we always exchanged smiles when we met.

I lost a lot of money in DZU. We had a 5-1/4 inch disc, for which we had purchased a license from Orka, and the idea was to manufacture it in Stara Zagora. However, at one period, the disc company was very slow in seizing a chance, because all kinds of people interfered in making decisions there, and the most varied interests appeared. Then Evtim Pandev and Dan Dooley came on the scene (Author's note: chiefs of the next disc development center, called Pont Peripherals), and they decided to make our joint enterprise insolvent. I paid the engineers for several months, but everything was calculated on producing discs at the plant. When it emerged that this could not happen, it was clear to me that I was being stupid, and I pulled out of the venture. We gave them a production license almost free. They paid us $400,000 for a license, when licenses normally cost $7, 10, 12, or 15 million. We simply wanted to manufacture the discs in Stara Zagora, because, in our branch (and not

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only in this branch), it is attractive to manufacture in Bulgaria. At that time, DZU had possibilities; it only had to decide its program and be put in touch with a partner. They started off with several things at the same time, and their money ran out. They lacked the professionals and the ability to make the lightning decisions that are needed to hit the target. Too bad. Be this as it may, DZU would have failed in 1989, had it not received the money from Neva. Therefore, if anyone has anything more to say about the Neva affair, let him apply to Ogi Bozarov, Krustyu Yanev, Stoyan Evtimov, and Georgi Manchev.

[Popova] When the Neva project was launched, Gen. Manchev said that the special services were not in a position to control movements in personal bank accounts abroad.

[Dimitrov] Naturally, and the representative of the so-called partner Hargetai [name as transliterated] did exactly what he liked. He stole $60 million from Kredit und Wechsel Bank in Vienna and a few other banks. As for the Russians, let us not mention them. Be that as it may, the Russians did pay their bills, at least the ones for whom I worked. Now, one wracks one's brain about how to get hold of $100 million; then, $100 million coming in or going out was a matter of no importance. However, the project was a big commercial operation that was very successful. Just imagine the situation if what happened to Gorbachev did not take place just them. In 1992, there were plans to transfer the plant to Russia. What would have happened if the plant had not taken off and failed to produce any profits? In those times, everyone would have been shot for sabotaging the system.

[Popova] The following story is also being spread. At the very time of the launch, French intelligence suddenly proved itself to be extremely competent and allegedly informed the U.S. special services about the marvelous things that the Bulgarian had stolen from the United States and given to the Russians. As a result, the CIA foisted the restructuring on us, and Kostroma (Author's note: the plant built in the USSR as a result of the Neva project) filled the gap, so that the DZU plant became a memorial to the past. Admiral Lacoste, the last chief of French intelligence in the years of perestroyka, advocated an even larger scale scheme. This was mentioned in an answer to a question asked by PARI at a news conference in Sofia last year.

[Dimitrov] Did the French devise the restructuring?

Well, they are always shouting about how great they are. For my part, however, I cannot think of a more stupid action than this one. I cannot understand how you can play against your own interests and then ponder how to escape from the situation you have created. This is at the end of the 20th century, in a country that is one of the five great powers, a member of G-5, let alone G-7. Where is my part in this story?

[Popova] No one has explained this yet, except that this explains, for example, how Giga Storage turns up with investments from eastern Europe in no other country than France.

[Dimitrov] Yes, but this does not tie in with the problems that I have had with the French. They should have helped me. Again, I realized where our system had come from, where Lenin took it from. Russia even copied its metro system from France. Socialism is a fact; it is much easier to live if you are a Frenchman. You may live more poorly than your colleagues throughout the world, but you do not have to strain yourself very much. The state cares for you. The difficulties come later, with the next need for changes.

Otherwise, this location is ideal for us. From the logistics viewpoint, it is excellent, in the center of Europe.

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Slovakia: Ministry Responds to U.S. Commission Statement

AU0508142696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 5 Aug 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Budapest Is Disguising Its Attempts Badly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Christopher H. Smith, chairman of the U.S. Congress Helsinki Commission, which drafts reports and information for U.S. congressmen on the observation of human rights and the rules of democracy in individual countries, issued a statement on 2 August 1996 on the outcome of the recent "Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders" conference in Budapest. The chairman of the Helsinki Commission had expected that the conference would deal with "specific issues" concerning the Hungarian minorities and is disappointed that its participants discussed "ambiguous support for autonomy" and "self-administrations" with the knowledge that the use of these terms has to "cause alarm in countries that are already concerned about alleged Hungarian irredentism." Christopher H. Smith points out that the application of these expressions without clarification creates the impression that "the declaration represents merely a poorly disguised attempt by Budapest to expand its influence beyond the current borders or to turn the clock back to the time when all Hungarians were united in a single country."

The Slovak Foreign Ministry identifies with the Helsinki Commission in its view that "the declaration, by using a formulation that, at best, is vague and, at worst, predictably inflammatory, runs counter to the objectives of the application of the policy of good neighborly relations acknowledged by Hungary." The Slovak Foreign Ministry thinks it is significant that the Helsinki Commission is also cognizant of Hungary's admission into NATO being made surprisingly conditional upon "the basic interests of the Hungarian ethnic communities beyond the borders." The Helsinki Commission, in connection with the recent terrorist attacks by Basque separatists, considers the Hungarian ambassador to the OSCE's advocation of the positive aspects of autonomy using the examples of the Basques, Catalonians, and South Tiroleans to be alarming and the Slovak Foreign Ministry even thinks it is dangerous.

The Slovak Foreign Ministry believes that the Hungarian Republic will take notice of the unacceptability of such courses of action, which will be regarded by a majority of countries as "a deviation from the constructive approach" and will alter its course so that the issue of the Hungarian minorities enjoys appropriate scope in European policy and does not slow down the Euro-Atlantic integrative process.

The Slovak Republic, in all of the binding international-legal documents, including the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty, has adopted and is implementing in practice the concept of individual rights for persons belonging to the ethnic minorities, a concept with which it guarantees protection for all legitimate rights oriented toward the preservation and development of their culture, traditions, and language. The Slovak Republic declares again its interest in and readiness to cooperate constructively with the Hungarian Republic so that their mutual relations are not an obstacle to their integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, but are proof of the maturity and readiness of Slovakia and Hungary to contribute to the atmosphere of democratic openness and partnership cooperation within these integrative structures.

In the opinion of the Slovak Foreign Ministry, the stance of the Helsinki Commission conveyed by C. H. Smith merits great appreciation due to its objectivity.

Slovakia: State Secretary Comments on Slovak NATO Entry

LD0508215396 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Jozef Sestak, Slovak Foreign Ministry state secretary, has received Ralph Johnson, the U.S. ambassador to Slovakia. The topic of the talks was, among other things, the 1996 draft law on NATO expansion approved by the U.S. Congress. Jozef Sestak expressed the hope that, after an objective assessment of the Slovak Republic's degree of preparation for integration into NATO and all the activities that Slovakia had been developing and preparing in this area, the United States will reconsider its decision and include Slovakia in the countries that had made considerable progress in the preparation for NATO membership. At the same time, Sestak handed over to the U.S. ambassador a viewpoint of the Slovak Foreign Ministry on the U.S. Congress law.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. State Secretary, what is the U.S. ambassador's attitude to the Foreign Ministry viewpoint?

[Sestak] We discussed several points with the ambassador, including this one. He accepted our position with understanding. We were pleased that he himself pointed to the fact that the U.S. draft law, in the so-called Article 8, which concerns regional initiative for air space and information systems within the Partnership for Peace program, enables Slovakia and a number of other states to draw funds for the support of these programs. So

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things are not as clear-cut or simple as is being depicted. I think that the ambassador understood our disappointment and I hope that our efforts at improvement will be accepted. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Slovakia: 'Chances' of NATO Entry in 'First Group' Viewed

AU0508130196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Pavol Minarik: "At the Moment, We Have Bad Luck"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The decision by the U.S. Congress to grant $60 million to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia to assist the preparations for their admission into NATO has caused a considerable stir in our country. It has not been caused, however, by the sum earmarked for this purpose, since $60 million is merely the amount that the Pentagon expends routinely every two and a quarter hours of its activity, but because Slovakia has been left out of the group for which this modest sum was earmarked. There are various reasons for this decision, just as our politicians are expressing various opinions on this step. While the coalition asserts overwhelmingly the point of view that Slovakia is being wronged again, the opposition claims that we—meaning the coalition—gave rise to this situation ourselves. The approval of symbolic support for the four European countries is indicative of many things, but it does not carry with it a concrete decision. Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton, who is one of the most influential people involved in the formulation of U.S. President Bill Clinton's foreign policy, said in Congress that he voted in favor of the assistance package because its provision does not automatically mean who will be admitted into NATO and when. At the same time, he announced that nothing else has been approved in the issue of the alliance's enlargement, apart from the decision that it will happen. Hamilton also pointed out that this will be a process lasting many months, perhaps even years. A NATO meeting will be held in December 1996 to plan this organization's summit the following year. The specific countries with which negotiations on entry into the alliance will begin are to be named at it for the first time. These negotiations will last a year or two. "The actual enlargement of NATO, however, may take place in quite a few years from now," emphasized Hamilton.

So, Slovakia's chances of incorporation into the aforementioned first group have not yet been buried definitively. A great deal will depend on what our government and its diplomacy do in the near future. If they realize the gravity of the situation and start to act rationally at home and abroad, we do not have to end up in the second lane. Anyone well informed about the situation among our neighbors knows that the Slovaks are not any worse off than the Czechs, Poles, or Hungarians. We have the same blood group as they do, not only theoretically, but actually. At the moment, it is just our bad luck that our politicians have not understood that the state interest has to be paramount. This applies everywhere in the world. Unfortunately, not in our country. At least at the moment.

Slovakia: Daily Finds Worst Lobbyists Against Country at Home

AU0508161296 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 5 Aug 96 p 3

[Commentary by Viliam Fabry: "We Also Have a 'Lobby'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When the Slovak Radio Washington correspondent reported that neither the U.S. Congress nor the Senate included Slovakia among the states to receive financial assistance in the process of preparations for admission into NATO, he said, among other things, that it is a result of the work of lobbyists who influence the congressmen and senators. There allegedly are as many as 20,000 registered lobbyists in the United States, who have a great impact on the state bodies and their decisions. It is a pity, our reporter said, that Slovakia does not have such lobbyists in the United States, and that our emigrants in the United States do not work for our benefit.

Well, thank you very much, I sighed, as the result of the "democratic" decisionmaking in the country that poses as the model of democracy, its guardian and protector around the world, is influenced by the effect of forces, which the Larousse encyclopedia calls "pressure groups" (groups de pression), if I disregard the definition in our *Dictionary of Foreign Words* (1979), which I consider more fitting and which characterizes lobbyism as a "corrupt system of influencing parliamentary representatives common in capitalist countries" (I emphasize the word corrupt).

I disagree only with one thing that the radio reporter said, that is, that we do not have any lobbyists. We do have them, and we pay them well, as there are many National Council of the Slovak Republic deputies among them, and even several former Slovak foreign ministers and ambassadors. The U.S. Congress and Senate did not need to lean on their U.S. lobbyists. What these, "our" lobbyists, say about or rather against Slovakia was enough for them.

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Slovakia: Daily Criticizes SNS Idea To Abrogate Hungarian Treaty

AU0608083896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Julius Lorincz: "How To Tread on a Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From circles close to the Slovak National Party [SNS]—which is part of the ruling coalition and thus, so to speak, an official representative of Slovakia—the opinion has already been voiced several times that it would perhaps be best to withdraw from the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty. SNS deputies voted in the National Council of the Slovak Republic in favor of the treaty's ratification a few months ago. Could it be that they did not know then that the ancestors of the Hungarians—their present-day descendants, in the interpretation of the "nationalists" do not, in essence, differ from the nomadic tribes—came into this region on small shaggy ponies as thugs, hoodlums, cutthroats, and bandits? Undoubtedly, the Budapest declaration from the Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders conference, with its genuinely unfortunate and inappropriate formulation on autonomy, has opened their eyes. Perhaps the SNS experts, in scrutinizing their proposal, will also reexamine the 1969 Vienna agreement on contractual law and weigh the consequences of their contemplated suggestion. Since they so often and quite absurdly compare Hungary's policy with the policy of Nazi Germany, it would be fitting if they were to remember that, for example, Hitler's Reich abrogated its treaty with the Soviet Union in June 1941 at the time it attacked it militarily. That is, they should state not only "a," but also "b." Or, how do they actually envision relations with Hungarians and Hungary when a treaty signed by the head of a government of which they are part and approved by a parliament in which this ruling coalition has a majority does not suit them?

Slovakia: Opposition Publicizes Meciar Privatization Guarantee

LD0608112896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The [left-wing opposition] Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] today made public a written guarantee by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar that privatization would be stopped. Meciar gave the guarantee to this opposition party for its help in averting the recent government crisis. Our stringer in Slovakia, Renata Havranova, phoned in the following details:

[Havranova] At that time, after the Slovak National Party and the Association of Workers' of Slovakia said they would leave the cabinet, Prime Minister Meciar would have been forced to form a minority government. However, the minority government would not be functional without the support of another parliamentary party. The SDL surprisingly backed Vladimir Meciar at that time and pledged to support the minority government. In exchange, it asked the prime minister to promise that the National Property Fund [FNM] would not issue any privatization decisions until the reconstruction of FNM bodies, where the opposition is not represented, had been carried out. According to the written statement signed by Vladimir Meciar and made public by the SDL today, this left-wing party received this political guarantee.

Immediately after the crisis blew over, the FNM unleashed a privatization avalanche. FNM President Stefan Gavornik has issued 41 decisions so far to directly sell off generally lucrative companies.

The SDL said that it regarded the continuation of privatization as a demonstration of a lack of political credibility by Prime Minister Meciar. Despite all this, the SDL intends to discuss with the [Meciar's] Movement for a Democratic Slovakia the inclusion of opposition representatives in bodies and institutions. According to Peter Weiss [former SDL chairman], this is the intrinsic interest of the Slovak Republic in its process of joining international structures.

Slovakia: FNM Decision 'Bad Sign' for SDL-HZDS Talks

AU0508153596 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 3 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by Julius Gembicky: "The SDL Will Decide on Monday on the Means of Publishing V. Meciar's Undertaking"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Political life is based on political agreements. We accepted the unilateral move by the prime minister in good faith," said Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) Deputy Chairwoman Brigita Schmognerova to NARODNA OBRODA yesterday in reaction to the sale of 41 lucrative enterprises agreed upon on Thursday [1 August] by the National Property Fund [FNM]. It did this despite the written guarantee from Prime Minister and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Chairman Vladimir Meciar that privatization will be suspended until the FNM's bodies are restructured. According to B. Schmognerova, the SDL was aware that this was not a legally binding promise, but merely a political commitment. She considers the fact that the prime minister has not kept it to be a bad sign for the talks that the HZDS has proposed to the SDL for the second half of August. The restructuring of the OKO [special

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supervisory body overseeing the activities of the secret service], the Slovak Television Council, Slovak Radio, the FNM, and the other supervisory bodies elected by parliament is supposed to be discussed at them. The talks should be oriented toward the democratization of the domestic political situation in Slovakia, which is applying for membership in NATO and the EU in the first round.

According to B. Schmognerova, the SDL's executive bodies will agree next Monday [5 August] on the time and method of publication of V. Meciar's written undertaking, which he handed to the SDL during the spiraling coalition crisis. "Therefore, I am merely expressing in advance my personal opinion that the violation of the commitment may also reduce the credibility of the conclusions we should reach during the upcoming talks with the HZDS," she said. Despite this, she thinks that it is necessary to discuss democratization steps so that the monochrome filling of the supervisory institutions is altered at the September session of parliament. The SDL, according to her, will insist on its original view that it is not enough to dismiss FNM Presidium President Stefan Gavornik, conceivably his vice president, Milan Rehak, and one more HZDS representative, but that it is necessary to restructure completely the FNM Presidium, the executive bodies, and the supervisory board to include representatives from several opposition parties.

"If there is no such inclination, this will be definitive confirmation of the fact that the coalition has strengthened itself internally and that it has given priority to privatization interests and protection of what it has acquired by privatization over the national-state interests of Slovakia, which are to exert the maximum effort possible for admission into NATO and the EU," said B. Schmognerova in conclusion.

Slovakia: Russia To Pay Off Debt by Supplying Aircraft

AU0508153496 Bratislava SME in Slovak 5 Aug 96 p 2

[CTK report: "Russia Will Pay Its Debts to Slovakia With Aircraft"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The most up-to-date version of the TU 154 M jet aircraft, which can carry 160 passengers and has a range of about five hours, is to be supplied to Slovakia within the framework of unfreezing Russia's debts. The aircraft will be supplied directly from the manufacturer with equipment corresponding to West European standards. This is a result of the talks that Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, marshal of the Russian Air Force, had in Bratislava last week. The first two aircraft should arrive in Slovakia in autumn. Shaposhnikov said that Russia was prepared to offer Slovakia multilateral assistance in establishing a national airline. He said that Slovakia had also shown interest in the new turboprop Ilyushins and Antonovs, capable of carrying 50-60 passengers, for its domestic routes and flights to neighboring states.

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Hungary: Antinuclear Demonstrators Commemorate Hiroshima

LD0508174496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] They will stay up until dawn. More than 50 Hungarian and foreign organizations started to commemorate the anniversary of the Hiroshima atomic bomb explosion a few minutes ago. Attila Kert reports from Batthyany Square in Budapest.

[Kert] A nuclear missile, naturally only a symbolic one, is set up here in Batthyany Square. This symbolic missile will be defused by the participants in the demonstration. There are some 200 to 300 people here in Batthyany Square. However, the organizers expect more people to come here later. The event will go on to as late as 0115, the exact time of the Hiroshima explosion.

The demonstrators would like to prevent nuclear weapons being stockpiled in Hungary under any circumstances. If Hungary happens to join NATO, the ban on stockpiling nuclear weapons in Hungary will have to be laid down in law beforehand, they demand.

The participants are planning to submit a petition with their demands to the foreign minister and the defense minister or at least to their representatives. They are also planning to submit petitions to Prime Minister Gyula Horn and parliamentary Speaker Zoltan Gal.

The people in Batthyany Square are listening to music at the moment because this is a musical demonstration.

They will walk to the Foreign Ministry building and then to the Defense Ministry. At the end they will walk to the parliament building, where the all-night demonstration will continue. There will be a multimedia performance with music and films screened. At midnight tonight, well-known intellectuals will deliver speeches. Commemorative candles will be lit at 0115.

Hungary: Army General Views Financial Conditions

AU0508154996 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Aug 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Peter Matyuc: "The Army Has Even Used Up Its Reserves—General Gruber: The Belt Has Been Torn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A 60,000-strong Army cannot be maintained with the sum granted to it in the budget, and the changes included in the parliamentary decision cannot be financed from this amount of money, either, Brigadier General Nandor Gruber, head of the Defense Ministry's Defense Management Main Department, has told NEPSZABADSAG.

The 1995 parliamentary decision on Army reform sets out the goal of establishing a smaller but more modern Army, with a higher strike capability. Since then, the Army has become smaller, but its strike capability is no higher because very little money can be spent on technical development, and it is only possible to keep outdated equipment in service with increasing costs, Gruber said. When we drew up the concept for the reform, we planned to have greater expenditure, while the big Army was cut back and modernized. The government said no to financing this, so parliament in 1995 received a bill to change the military force rather than a concept of reforming the military force. The reform had envisaged giving 2.5 percent of the GDP to the Army, but it soon became clear that this was not possible. The nominal value of the defense budget has not increased in recent years, and its real value has decreased in line with inflation. Today, rather than talking about tightening the belt, we are discussing how to tie a torn belt together with a piece of string, was how Gruber summed up the situation.

Gruber said that, in its current form, the change of the military force represents a goal of personnel reductions, but, owing to the lack of money, the Army cannot take any concrete steps toward buying more modern weapons and improving its strike capability.

Savings can only be made through large-scale investment, Gruber believes. He mentioned the much-debated radar tender as an example: At the moment, many thousands of people are supervising the Hungarian airspace because this task is being carried out by many outdated radar stations with high energy consumption, which could be replaced by four modern sets of equipment and a few dozen regular soldiers. However, this investment would cost billions of forints, and renewing and replacing the Army's weapons and other equipment would cost a similar sum.

We do not have any reserves that we can use, and we should be starting to restock the reserves, Gruber said in reply to whether the Army has used up its reserves. We would only be able to modernize it by using outside resources because our internal resources have been exhausted, he continued. We cannot even sell property because the real estate market is stagnating in the whole country, and we do not even have the money to pay for the compulsory estimates before advertising. We can only hope that the Treasury or local governments will take over the property that can be used in some way—and which cost us a lot to guard.

Gruber has similar thoughts about the Army's surplus stocks waiting for destruction: He hopes that some spare parts and certain elements of the equipment and

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ammunition awaiting destruction can be reused and that the destruction will be done in exchange for the metal that can be gained. As it happens, some of the redundant stocks, such as Scud missile warheads, cannot be destroyed in Hungary but can only be dismantled abroad.

Gruber also spoke about the corporations owned by the Army: Some of them are profitable, but most are loss-making. At the same time, they have to be maintained because the Army cannot preserve its strike capability without a repair, development, and production background.

In Gruber's view, the 1998 goal of military reform, according to which an Army of 60,000 should by then be established, is unachievable. This size cannot be maintained from the money allocated to the Army by the budget. He did not wish to enter into speculation about how big an army can be financed, saying that it was the politicians' job to define this, as it was to finance the Army's ability to function. He also said that the parliamentary decision stipulated that 15 percent of the budget had to be used for development—as he put it, accumulation. However, there was no chance for this even in the 1997 budget because the Finance Ministry was planning to spend much less on accumulation.

Hungary: Air Force 'Unable To Fulfill Its Mission'

AU0608082996 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 3 Aug 96 pp 1, 4

[Correspondent's report: "We Do Not Have an Air Force?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, the 47th Air Force Unit of Papa has carried out a live ammunition exercise. From information both learned on location and provided by experts, we have come across many shocking facts regarding the situation of the Hungarian air force and national security.

Here are the sad facts. Among the aircraft prepared for takeoff, one MiG-21 and one MiG-23 proved unfit for flying. Because of blocked wheels the aircraft providing weather information almost had an accident and succeeded in landing only after performing some "tricks." The missile arrays capable of carrying 16 small missiles carried only four of ammunition instead of their full capacity of 250, while the machine guns carried only 70 rounds.

The firing range at Hajmasker caught fire, but it proved impossible to put it out because of a faulty engine in the Mi-8 fire-fighting helicopter and the breakdown of the fire engine sent to the location. In the meantime, the deadline of 1700 hours local time was approaching rapidly, so the firing exercise was interrupted.

According to our information the SU-22 combat aircraft, the former pride of the "Kapos" air force unit that was forced to move out of Taszar, are practically undeployable. Only three pilots were left for the five aircraft that have recently been overhauled. The other pilots have been dismissed in the wake of personnel cuts. Since at the moment this is the only type of combat aircraft capable of providing efficient support for land troops, the practically nonexistent combat value of the "Furkeszdarazs" combat unit is a big weakness in our national security.

Nor can we tolerate the "operational uncertainty" of old aircraft. In addition the MiG-29's of the Kecskemet air force unit, Hungary's only combat-ready air defense unit today, are stored in the open, so they will not last long either, not to mention their complete lack of tactical defense.

From these experiences we can definitely declare that despite all the diligence of our air force servicemen, the Hungarian air defense is currently unable to fulfill its mission. Its combat means are quite vulnerable, and its personnel have either left because of a lack of financial appreciation or were dismissed in the wake of personnel cuts. There are political reasons behind the fact that the air force appears as a budget element at all. To openly give up the armed forces would still be a risky parliamentary act, an act equivalent to political suicide. A military acknowledgment of the lack of combat value is delayed for simple subsistence reasons.

It should be mentioned here that during the party that followed the peace partnership exercise in Szolnok, a U.S. general informed his Hungarian colleague that the U.S. Air Force would request both the Szolnok and Papa airfields after Taszar.

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B-H: Croats, Muslims Reach Agreement on Mostar

LD0608134396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Shortly before 1400 [1200 GMT] the Croat and Bosniak sides reached an agreement on resolving the crisis in Mostar resulting from the termination of the EU administration mandate. There was no legal foundations for continuing the EU administration. Miljenko Karacic reporting from Mostar for Croatian radio.

[Karacic] The Joint Action agreement was meant to outline terms for the continued presence in Mostar of the EU and its special envoy, Martin Garrod. Efforts to harmonize Article Four of the agreement went on throughout the night. The Croat and Bosniak side negotiated from 2200 [2000 GMT] last night until early this morning when the negotiations were interrupted to be resumed at 1100 [0900 GMT] today. Patience has borne fruit. The Joint Action agreement, signed by both sides, includes all the elements that the Croat side insisted on. Both sides pledged to cooperate with the EU and its special envoy Martin Garrod.

The city council will meet in August to elect the mayor from among the Croats and his deputy from among the Bosniaks. They will cooperate with Martin Garrod over all issues within their purview. The council will meet again following the ruling by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Croat complaint about the irregularities of the Mostar elections.

Immediately after the agreement had been signed, Mijo Brajkovic, president of the Mostar municipal council, said that the signing of the agreement would clear the way for organizing the city in line with the Dayton agreement, which the Croat side had been advocating all the time. This means not just forming a city council and electing the mayor and his deputy, but also the formation of six municipalities, three with a Croat majority and three with a Muslim majority.

The agreement will, however, not resolve all the problems of Mostar. Unfortunately, a serious incident took place on Bulevar [the separation line]. While the negotiations were in progress, a car with a Croat registration plate was stoned from a cafe run by the Bosniak authorities. The driver of the car was seriously injured. It is clear that behind the incident are individuals who are against the agreement and who are to some extent encouraged by the international community and its constant pressures on the Croat side, while at the same time ignoring the fact that the other side very often obstructs existing agreements.

B-H: Soljic Briefs HVO Officers on Defense Law

LD0408181796 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 4 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A large number of Croat Defense Council [HVO] officers attended a military symposium in Neum today. Asked by our reporter Milan Vego about the topics discussed at the symposium, Federation Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic said the following:

[Begin recording] [Soljic] Whenever a defense law is drawn up people justifiably show a lot of interest, because in this part of the world people write and interpret laws as they please. However, I would like to say that our defense law is totally clear; I have explained to the top HVO brass the most important provisions contained in the law, and I think that they had no objections to them. I think, I am even sure, that the implementation of the law will not be weighed down with difficulties.

[Vego] Minister Soljic, are there any doubts as to whether the future army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be made up of two components [Muslim-Bosniak army and Croat Defense Council]?

[Soljic] There is no doubt in this respect. We would not have spent six months drawing up the law if that issue could have been resolved in a simple way. The law on defense is in accordance with the Dayton agreement, which says that the federal army is made up of two components consisting of all units up to corps level.

The right of choice regarding the components remains valid. I believe that conditions have been created to guarantee the protection of interests of both nations, which has always been our objective, because we do not ask for anything more, nor can we accept anything less than that.

[Vego] What can you tell us about the Train and Equip Program?

[Soljic] Our army in the field is extremely well trained. They have acquired practical skills. The Train and Equip Program will give them additional theoretical knowledge, which will make our army perfectly effective and proportionate to our financial capabilities.

[Vego] Is the HVO ready to be deployed at any given time? This was the question that we put to Colonel General Zivko Budimir, the HVO chief of General Staff.

[Budimir] I can only say that the HVO is ready to act on orders issued by the top Bosnian Croat political officials. [end recording]

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B-H: IFOR Seizes Bosnian Croat Arms Cache, Bans HVO Flights

AU0308133496 Paris AFP in English 1109 GMT 3 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 3 (AFP)—NATO forces seized an arms cache stored in a Bosnian Croat police station and banned all flights by the Croat forces in Bosnia, an IFOR spokesman said Saturday.

The weapons, including 20 assault rifles, rocket launchers, mines and several cases of ammunition were found Friday at the station in Doljani, near the southern Bosnian town of Jablanica.

Under Bosnia's peace accord, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) strictly controls all the weaponry of the former warring sides in Bosnia.

IFOR also controls military flights in Bosnian airspace. Earlier this week, the Bosnian Croat (HVO) army commander was flown by an unauthorised helicopter from neighbouring Croatia into Bosnia.

"As a result all HVO fixed and r ›ry wing flights will be banned until further notice," IFOR spokesman Major Brett Boudreau said. A similar ban imposed last month on the mainly Moslem Bosnian army is still in place, Boudreau added.

B-H: IFOR's Lopez Expresses 'Concern' Over Dayton Violations

AU0508150496 Paris AFP in English 1451 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 5 (AFP)—The new commander of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force [IFOR], U.S. Admiral Joseph Lopez expressed concern Monday [5 August] at continued violations of Bosnia's peace accord.

Speaking after meeting senior military officers from Bosnia's three former warring factions, Lopez said he was worried that heavy weapons were still being found in unauthorised sites and at the lack of cooperation over indicted war criminals.

"IFOR continues to find weapons and equipment either undeclared or in unauthorised locations, some over 100 days after they were to have been properly declared and stored," Lopez told reporters.

Under rules agreed in Bosnia's Dayton peace accord, IFOR checks the whereabouts and storage of all heavy guns and weaponry in the separate Serb, Moslem [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] and Croat army arsenals.

The IFOR commander, who took over his new position on July 31, also criticised the lack of cooperation by Bosnia's factions with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

Under Dayton, each side must turn over those indicted by the war crimes tribunal. Though IFOR has the power to arrest these people, it has drawn back from hunting them down.

"I reminded the military leaders of their obligation to convey to their political leaders that more must be done...in this area," Lopez said.

B-H: IFOR Carries Out Inspection of 3d Corps Arsenal

AU0408203396 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by A. Djonlic: "Support for the Peace Plan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] High-ranking officers of the U.S. (multinational) North Division, headed by Colonel Alan Trasher, inspected the arsenal and antiaircraft equipment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the Zenica barracks.

The goal of the two-hour inspection was to determine the status after the initial inspection of collected armaments. IFOR, after having collected the Army's armaments into a single location, inspected and catalogued the arms; the objective of this latest inspection was to see whether the data matched.

We learned in conversation with the officers who carried out the inspection that a joint commission comprised of army members from both entities have carried out much more frequent inspections. The commission has nine members (two Croatian Defense Council and Bosnia-Herzegovina Army officers, four officers of the Serb Republic Army, and the chief inspector, an IFOR officer). The comprehensive inspection was (most probably) carried out with the goal of opening the skies over Bosnia-Herzegovina to civilian traffic.

In addition to expressing his thanks for the extended hospitality, Col. Trasher said:

The inspection went very well. This is more proof of adherence to the peace plan, and confirmation that very friendly ties exist between us.

Trasher also remarked on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's significant improvement in the safekeeping of the arms; Trasher also commented on the possible opening of Bosnia-Herzegovina skies to civilian air traffic:

We are working on creating conditions for civilian, that is, commercial flights. At the same time, we are also discussing ways to make this easier.

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Col. Haso Ribo, member of the 3d Army Corps's command, said the following about the IFOR visit: These are antiaircraft arms from several units, which is proof that we have carried out what we were asked to do. There are no unresolved issues between IFOR and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 3d Corps.

B-H: Army Builds New Airport, Logistics Base Near Visoko

AU0408205696 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 4

[Report by Denis Kuljis: "Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Is Turning the Secret Airport in Visoko Into a Huge Logistics Base With a 2-km Runway!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina is simmering, war is a matter of moments! Muslims are walking around Mostar armed to the teeth, quite nervous, and trigger-happy. However, French IFOR soldiers were not wounded in an incident provoked by the tension: they were attacked because they came too close to a vital military base. The latest issue of JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, an exceptionally well-informed international magazine and an authority in defense matters, brought more details about that military base.

The magazine brought out the sensational news about the secret Muslim military airport in Visoko with a concrete 2-km runway. Ever since its construction in 1993, the place has been the main supply base of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. According to the JANE'S, the airport was designed by the "experts of a U.S. civil engineering company" who specialized in airport construction.

It was built by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Aircraft carrying military aid, especially from Iran, landed on that runway instead of the one in Tuzla, which was too close to the Serbs. When IFOR gained control over the effectives of the parties in the Bosnian conflict, the French members of the UN forces took control over the airport, and thus "limited the Iranian influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina," JANE'S said. The UN forces also found a mixed squadron of Mi-8 transport helicopters, mostly unoperable due to insufficient maintenance.

The Fatal Runway

Those helicopters communicated with Bihac while it was under siege and carried goods of vital importance. Many were operated by Russian pilots, and the media reported of some of these pilots being killed in action.

The 2-km runway is more than sufficiently long for Hercules transport aircraft, of which Iran has 32. Carrying its maximum load (the total weight of the aircraft carrying 20 tonnes of load is 60 tonnes), the Hercules can land on a runway that is less than 450 meters long. If the runway is steep (or there is, for instance, a 15-meter obstacle at the beginning on the runway), 800 meters will still be enough. The aircraft needs 1 km to 1,200 meters of concrete runway to take off....

NACIONAL reporters tried to reach the runway in Visoko. The French soldiers had left the runway and then reapproached it, which was almost fatal for them....

The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government recently began construction in the hinterland near Visoko, on the airport that was used by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Air Force in 1993. Followed by the alert eyes of the local people and Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers, we took the macadam road to the airport. The village in the vicinity of the airport was full of big trucks and bulldozers. Guards in camouflage uniforms did not let us enter the construction site. Beside the gate we saw an ultralight single-seater, the kind that is usually used for reconnaissance. The guards said we were not allowed to take photographs: a foreign network had tried to do that several days before, and the entire area was mobilized and additional guards placed around the airport.

We tried to climb the hill next to the airport, but the armed guards stopped us and said that it was not the road to Visoko. The construction site is on an elevation, and the other side of the hill hides the old airport that is being reconstructed.

Appropriate Logistic Base

The guards did not want to give us any information. They tried to convince us that the reconstructed airport would not be used for military purposes.

The purpose of the intervention on the runway in Visoko is to lengthen the runway to 3 km, so it can land civilian transport aircraft and jumbo jets like the Iranian 747 that brought weapons to Pleso Airport [Zagreb] during the war. The runway in Visoko was within the range of Serb artillery and was shelled several times in 1994. Nevertheless, its location is much better than those of the airports in Sarajevo or Tuzla. The Bosnian Government purchased an An-74 [as published], a state-of-the-art transport jet aircraft. Besides, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has modernized its equipment with Abrams, Apache, and other sophisticated aircraft and other systems. Apparently, an appropriate logistic base will enable them to conduct long military operations.

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B-H: IFOR Presence in Velika Kladusa Causing 'Unease'

LD0508214696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] IFOR members have been patrolling Velika Kladusa since this morning. In a perfectly peaceful town, this move has justifiably caused unease among the citizens. Emin Huskic has a report:

[Huskic] There has been no reliable explanation, but it can be surmised that IFOR members have been warned that incidents could flare up if Fikret Abdic intensified his election campaign. The security situation in Velika Kladusa has been extremely good since the departure of the Croat and Turkish police. This has also been confirmed by Ivan Jarnjak, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, and Avdo Hebib, the [Bosnian] federal minister of internal affairs.

The lack of clear and reliable information has opened the door wide to rumors. A great number of Velika Kladusa citizens who were members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina defense shield against aggression and fascism belive that IFOR is here to protect Abdic's candidates in the election campaign. If such presumptions turn out to be true, the IFOR mission will be seriously compromised, because even before an invitation from the Hague tribunal is issued, Fikret Abdic is perceived by the people of the Una-Sana canton as a confirmed war criminal, since the consequences of his actions are obvious and painful. [passage omitted]

B-H: Croats in Zenica Assailed by Grenades, Gunfire

LD0508170696 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] For the Croats in Zenica [central Bosnia] the last weekend passed in an atmosphere created by grenades and shooting from machine guns. The Croat houses were shot at from machine guns in Tocilici near Perin Han [south of Zenica] between 2030 and 2130 [1830-1930 GMT; date not specified]. Five bullets hit the house owned by Stipe Zec and two bullets broke a window in the house of Mate Zec, which was full of guests. No one was hurt.

At the same time, five rounds were shot at the house of Marko Milanovic. Very close to his house is the house of Stipe Jozic, at which a hand grenade was thrown causing, fortunately, only material damage. No one was hurt again. Two hand grenades were thrown at the same house on Sunday [4 August], causing only material damage.

The Zenica municipal committee of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ—Bosnian Croat ruling party] interprets the incidents as provocation related to the fourth convention of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Neum. This is also the latest pressure exerted on the Croats in Zenica and a reflection of someone's desire to make them leave the area.

The Zenica Interior Ministry has not yet issued a statement with any relevant information. Our correspondent in Zenica wonders if silence will cover up this event, too.

B-H: Commentary Considers Choice Between Washington, Tehran

AU0408201496 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Simic: "Between Two Fires"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Bosnians do not need $50 million from Iran." This assessment made by the State Department has once again made topical the issue of relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iran on the one hand, and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United States on the other. The Bosnian Government is again between "two fires." The U.S. is making its economic, military, political, and every other aid contingent on a suspension of all relations with Iran. At the same time, Bosnia-Herzegovina has a moral obligation to Iran which, in critical times during the four-year war, extended all aspects of aid, including military aid. The Bosnian Government's wish to maintain normal relations with both countries, the United States and Iran, has not met with U.S. approval, which made it clear on several occasions that it wants Sarajevo to choose between Washington and Tehran.

Assurances given by both the Bosnian and Iranian officials that this is purely economic cooperation has not fallen on "fertile soil" in the United States. To put it simply, the United States does not want the Iranian presence anywhere where there are U.S. troops and money.

The U.S. arguments are pretty convincing and solid, namely, $550 million of U.S. aid for reconstruction in Bosnia, which is almost one third of the $1.8 billion planned for this year. In addition, there is the project to train and equip the Federal Army, where the United States again has the main say. Theoretically speaking, it is Bosnia-Herzegovina's internal affair and its sovereign right to decide with whom it will maintain relations. In practice, however, the country's sovereignty has long been "a dead letter." Keeping in mind reality, whether or not Bosnia-Herzegovina will accept Iran's economic aid

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is no longer an issue; the only issue is how it will thank Iran for the offer, but that is a purely technical point. In real life, and particularly in politics, everything has its price. As long as we are economically and politically dependent on others, the right to choose our foreign policy partners will least of all depend on us.

B-H: Bildt Notes 'Challenges' Facing Bosnia

MS0208120996 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 2 Aug 96 p 14

[Article by Carl Bildt, EU's representative in charge of implementing civilian aspects of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Can it work? This is by far the most frequently asked question about the peace process in Bosnia. And can the countries contributing to the Ifor peace implementation force really count on their troops leaving at the end of the year?

The record after almost eight months of implementing the peace accord agreed at Dayton is a mixed one.

Mr Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serb entity, has been pressed into handing over all formal public and party functions. But Mrs Biljana Plavsic, acting president of Republika Srpska, the Serb-controlled part of Bosnia, is talking about creating "an ethnic state" in terms which indirectly condone ethnic cleansing. Not until Mr Karadzic appears in The Hague to answer war crimes charges can the full normalisation of relations with the Serb entity begin in earnest.

In the Moslem-Croat Federation, the other entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tensions remain between the two communities, as illustrated by the latest divisions over Mostar. The last remaining Catholic church in the Moslem stronghold of Bugojno was recently the target of arsonists, and there has been a similar outrage against a mosque in Prozor, a Croat-held town.

But the positive signs are there. On Tuesday, the first train for 1,564 days travelled from Sarajevo to Mostar and on to the Adriatic port of Ploce—on lines rebuilt with European Union money. It was heralded by Mr Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian president, as the second end of the Sarajevo siege.

For all the inadequacies of economic policymaking and the slowness of international help, the cafes are opening, the farms are being cultivated and some factories are beginning to work. The first signs of economic revival are visible.

Bosnia is now heading for elections on September 14, and after the elections comes the crucial phase when the common institutions of the country will be set up and—I hope—start to operate. This is the most difficult and important part of the peace implementation this year—far more difficult than the separation of military forces and transfer of territory carried out by Ifor at the beginning of the year.

Election campaigns inevitably stress what separates rather than what unites. The chances of the election diminishing the influence of ethnic-based politics in the three communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are sadly approaching zero. And if there is any change in attitudes, it is a hardening of those which have driven the country to ethnic separation and ultimately war.

The common institutions that will be created after the elections—presidency, parliamentary assembly, council of ministers, central bank, constitutional court, standing committee on military forces—will work only if there is a reasonable understanding between the three communities and the two entities. This requires a more or less common understanding of the nature of the peace agreement.

Here, views are very different. On one side, there is the effort to interpret the agreement as a recipe for a unitary Bosnian state, with no real role for the two existing entities. On the other, there is a tendency to see the Bosnian Serb entity as practically independent and its boundary as a state border.

Neither of these interpretations is correct—the peace agreement sets up what is in essence a federal state. It will be a very loose and highly decentralised state with weak central powers for its common institutions—and thus unlike any other state in existence.

The centrifugal tendencies are obvious, and on occasions receive encouragement from Zagreb and Belgrade. It will thus require sustained international presence and pressure in the region to stop the Bosnian state from disintegrating during the first critical period of living together again.

One year is not enough time for the forces of healing and reconciliation to become more powerful than the forces of separation and revenge. As I made clear in my report to the UN Security Council, the involvement of the international community must last longer than the end of the year and extend beyond Bosnia.

The French government has proposed a two-year period of consolidation, and the steering board of the Peace Implementation Council, which I chair has started to discuss the period after 1996. In Bosnia itself, I am seeking agreement for new all-Bosnia elections in September 1998, thus giving the country a two-year period to consolidate the peace and refine the national and international structures to support it.

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Such a period of consolidation must in all probability be supported by a military presence in the county and the region—at least initially. Ifor will leave at the end of the year, but on present trends a substantially smaller but very robust force will be needed to deter those thinking in terms of war again. Its composition must reflect the transatlantic coalition which—with Russian participation—is so actively pursuing the peace effort.

But a security presence is only one part of the overall commitment. The European Union must develop its "regional approach" to start making a long-term contribution to stability in the region by creating as free an environment for trade and economic co-operation as possible.

This would not only link the different parts of the area together, but also draw them into the long-term process of European integration. And it would give the EU more powerful leverage in Zagreb and Belgrade than now.

In spite of all the problems, I believe the peace can hold, and the extremely ambitious goals of the peace agreement can be realised gradually. But the challenges are enormous.

What has been done so far this year has been simple compared with what lies ahead. It would be naive to believe that those involved in implementing the peace agreement can just pack up and go home at the end of the year.

If we are lucky, we shall have made a start towards building a genuine peace maybe not much more. Nevertheless, that would be an impressive achievement after all that has happened to Bosnia over the four past years.

B-H: Bosniaks Block Road To Stop Serb Refugees' Return

AU0508172096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1535 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 5 August (BETA)—Some hundred Muslims blocked the road from Sarajevo to Osijek, protesting the return of Serb refugees to their homes, IFOR reported at a news conference today in Sarajevo. The incident took place yesterday.

A group consisting mostly of women and children yesterday put up a barricade in Ilidza to stop people whom they considered to be Serb refugees.

According to ONASA, the demonstrators attacked members of the international police force (IPTF) with sticks and stones when the latter arrived on the scene, breaking a windshield and injuring a passerby.

IPTF Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald said that the local Federation police reacted slowly, but finally resolved the situation. The buses that were supposedly carrying the Serb refugees were actually transporting Muslims.

Fitzgerald said that this is the latest in a series of Muslim incidents in the region and that 240 mostly old and infirm Bosnian Serbs remained in the area.

B-H: Plavsic: Elections Decisive for Serb Republic's Survival

LD0208164896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1404 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Obrenovac, 2 Aug (TANJUG)—The talks with [U.S. Assistant Secretary of State] John Kornblum were very comprehensive and focused on concrete issues, exclusively concerning the implementation of the Dayton agreement, Biljana Plavsic, acting [Bosnian] Serb Republic president, said today in an interview on Radio Obrenovac.

"We will continue to implement it consistently, but we will also insist on its terminology because the Dayton agreement does not mention at any point the reintegration of the Serb Republic into Bosnia-Herzegovina," Plavsic stressed.

If the other sides shows goodwill, she added, after the elections we will take part in the work of the joint bodies of the future union, and if there is even one single shared point between the three sides in the conflict, that could provide a good basis for cooperation. According to her, that shared point could be a firm commitment to peace.

Speaking about the forthcoming elections, Plavsic said that they are "a matter of life and death" for the Serb Republic. "The elections will not merely decide which party will hold power in the Serb Republic. This is of a lesser importance compared to the fact that the elections will be decisive for the survival of the Serb Republic. After the elections, the Serb Republic will officially be a state, or, as the [?international players] say, an entity with a series of elements which confirm its sovereignty," the acting president of the Serb Republic said.

Plavsic said that the citizens of the Serb Republic who had fled to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of the aggression should also be aware of this fact, and she called on them to come and vote in the Serb Republic on 14 September "in the name of this goal."

"The future destiny of [former Bosnian Serb President] Radovan Karadzic was not discussed with John Kornblum. Consequently no agreement could be reached on his extradition, contrary to what some media have reported," she said.

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B-H: Plavsic Stresses No 'Deviations' From Dayton Accord

LD0508194896 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The provisions of the Dayton agreement are sacred and there should not be and must not be any deviations from them, Biljana Plavsic, vice president and acting president of the Serb Republic, said today in an interview to the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI.

The acting president of the Serb Republic believes that the civilian part of the Dayton agreement is far more complex than the military one and that the reason for difficulties which arise in its implementation is insufficient knowledge on the part of those who signed the agreement.

According to Plavsic, the interentity boundary line in the area of Brcko municipality is controversial. The problem is whether the de facto situation is to remain, in other words the 6-km corridor, or whether Krajina will be linked to the other parts of the Serb Republic with a 20-km (?corridor) like the one linking Gorazde to Sarajevo.

B-H: Plavsic Discusses Coming Elections, Dayton Agreement

LD0508225996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1920 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mrkonjic Grad, 5 Aug (SRNA)—Biljana Plavsic, vice president and acting president of the Serb Republic, had talks in Mrkonjic Grad today with representatives of the local authorities, war veterans, and businessmen on current problems which the local people are encountering after their return from a five-month exile.

Prof. Plavsic informed her hosts on plans and endeavors of the Serb Republic leadership to ensure that this region, which was completely destroyed and pilaged after the withdrawal of the Croatian army, is given priority in reconstruction and rebuilding.

Speaking on the forthcoming elections, Plavsic stressed the need for the election campaign to pass in a civilized and democratic atmosphere, and appealed to the representatives of all parties to stop sticking labels on individuals from opposing parties if they do not possess valid proof of their accusations.

"There are also two parties in the elections who have called the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] criminal, which clearly shows their intentions and plans in this territory," Plavsic warned.

She said that the fact that no political party from the Serb Republic has put forward its lists of candidates in the elections in the Croat-Muslim Federation clearly shows the maturity of the Serb people.

"By putting forward electoral lists at almost all levels in the Serb Republic, Muslims have clearly demonstrated their unhealthy ambitions and unrealistic wishes to rule the Serb people," Dr. Plavsic said, adding that "the international community—if it does have good and just intentions—should draw conclusions from this."

"These are not ordinary elections and if the results were negative in relation to the real interests of the Serb people, then the only loser will be the Serb people, and the winners will be certain unhealthy individuals," Prof. Plavsic said, warning that the international community is helping some opposition parties to achieve this.

Commenting on the voting of refugees from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], she said that those votes will be of benefit only if the refugees come in person to cast their ballots in the Serb Republic, and not in absentia.

"According to our information, many associations of Serbs in the FRY are already making preparations for organized arrival of refugees to the polling stations in the Serb Republic in order to manifest, in the best possible way, their devotion to their people," Vice President Plavsic said.

Speaking about the Dayton agreement, she stressed the main advantages of this document, which include, according to her, the territorial division on the basis of which the Serb Republic received 49 percent of the overall area of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"The present situation in the Croat-Muslim Federation shows the advantage of the fact that the Serb Republic is encircled by a border. In spite of this, we do not wish to take advantage of such a state of affairs nor do we wish to take sides," Prof. Plavsic said, reiterating the position of the Serb leadership. Underlining the importance of the forthcoming elections, she said that 10 days after the end of elections the sanctions against the FRY and the Serb Republic will be definitely lifted, something that should never be ignored.

The vice president of the Serb Republic said that the forthcoming elections are a chance for the SDS to realize, for the first time in peace, a high-quality and comprehensive program which could not have been implemented during the war and postwar conditions because of the constant pressures from the international community.

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Along with the municipality leadership, headed by its president, Dragan Celic, today's talks were also attended by representatives of the local community of Jezero, who have expressed their wish to join the municipality of Mrkonjic Grad. The final decision on this will be taken by the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic.

Within the framework of the one-day visit to this town, Biljana Plavsic received Mileva Zulic, mother of three fallen soldiers, Stevan, Zeljko, and Zivko. Later she laid a wreath on the communal tomb of the Serb fighters in Mrkonjic-Grad.

B-H: Plavsic Organizes Meeting With Serb Opposition Parties

AU0508171396 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by Lijlana Kovacevic: "The Media Are a Stumbling Block"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a four-year war that has laid waste the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and forced hundreds of thousands of people to leave their homes, is it possible to conduct an election campaign and the elections themselves in an atmosphere of tolerance and democracy? Representatives of the political parties whose candidates are running in the elections in the Serb Republic have been trying to resolve this dilemma at a meeting organized in Banja Luka on the initiative of Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the Serb Republic. The political scene in the Serb Republic, sluggish during the years of war, has now awakened and the political parties, including those that are newly formed, as well as those whose central headquarters are across the Drina River, are demanding breathing space in the media in order to take the best possible position in the race for votes. Criticism of the work of state institutions was the starting point for the representatives of almost all the opposition parties, who threatened to protest to the OSCE, which is supervising the election preparations in Bosnia. The opposition has demanded that the media respect the codex prescribed by the OSCE and be more objective in their approach toward the programs and presentations of certain political forces, while some parties, among them the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, have accused the ruling SDS [Serb Democratic Party] of undermining and banning the public promotion of the Socialists in many parts of the Serb Republic. Nevertheless, this meeting has again shown that ideological differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties and those in the center are difficult to overcome. Therefore, as Biljana Plavsic said at the end of the meeting, it is necessary to achieve a spirit of tolerance and democracy through dialogue and exchange of information in order to make the difficult life of the people of the Serb Republic easier and to eradicate further confusion among the people here in a position when the Serb Republic is under constant pressure from the international community. "It is my duty to worry about peace and order in the Serb Republic, particularly in this boiling atmosphere," Dr. Biljana Plavsic said, announcing that she would endeavor to correct any justified and documented criticisms of the opposition to the work of state institutions.

Although, at the meeting of the party representatives and the acting president of the Serb Republic, opinions were voiced that in these parts there was still an active division into "Chetniks" and "Partisans," the minimum national interests, defined at the previous meeting of the same type, was not threatened.

The Serb Republic is a state of the Serb people, the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina would mean its dissolution, and continued pressure against the Serb Republic's state leadership is unacceptable: These were the main points of the accepted minimum of national interests.

The meeting between the representatives of political parties that will run in the elections and the acting president of the Serb Republic was also attended by members of all other parties from the Serb Republic and representative of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], while the representatives of the Muslim SDA [Party of Democratic Action] did not show any interest in a dialogue with the Serb authorities.

B-H: Serb Commentary Criticizes U.S. Influence on Elections

AU3107172696 Sarajevo JAVNOST (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jul 96 p 7

[Commentary by Dusan Maric: "The Sheriff With the Black Hat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the very same day that the Olympic Games were opened in the U.S. state of Georgia, accompanied by large-scale media drivel about the Olympic spirit, democracy, and equality among nations, a new U.S.-directed felony against democracy and the Olympic spirit among nations was committed on the territory of the late Yugoslavia, as part of a fascist campaign to ruthlessly deprive the Serb nation of the basic principles of democracy—the freedom of political organization and the right to vote freely.

First, the democratically elected president of the Serb Republic, Radovan Karadzic, was forced to sign a document stating that he would withdraw as president of the Serb Republic [RS] and as chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], or else the SDS, as

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the most authentic and massive representative of the Serb people's national and age-old aspirations, would be banned from taking part in the upcoming elections.

By this broncobusting act of coercion, the gravediggers of diplomacy and international law have brutally violated the will of the majority of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, demonstrated during the prewar elections, wartime referendums, and postwar expressions of support, for Dr. Karadzic to head the Serb Republic until the next democratic elections.

Precedent

But what happened with Karadzic, the president of the state, is neither unexpected nor unusual in international relations. History is full of examples of presidents and other leaders of different countries having to leave office for various (un)justified reasons, under pressure from one or a number of powerful countries.

The main goal of the policy of the new world order, which the United States is trying to force upon humanity, is to create conditions, either by peaceful means (pressure, coercion, and lies such as those about Serb war criminals), or through war, for the international league of usurers to set up and remove puppet regimes in as many countries as possible, whenever and however they please.

But we believe that this is the first time in the world's more recent political history that the so-called international community is stooping so low in their filth as to publicly remove the leader of a political party by applying pressure. To deprive a group of people organized into a political party to better implement their political views, of the right to elect their own leader, someone who will best represent them, is not only an attack against basic human and political freedoms, but sheer blindness and idiocy.

It would be interesting to know whether the third-rate U.S. saxophone player and his first-rate western European lackeys, currently allies in their mission to terrorize civilizations, are really in such disharmony with common sense that they believe that, even after their last dirty trick, there is a single member of the SDS who does not see Radovan Karadzic as the leader of that party, that there is a rational Serb who has retained a grain of personal dignity and national pride and who does not look up to the "criminal from Pale" as a true president and leader of the only Serb state!

The second act of vandalism of this urbane diplomacy against the rights of the Serb people was committed by depriving the Serbs banished from the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina union of their right to vote at the upcoming elections on an equal footing with the Croats and Muslims.

Choice

The representatives of the OSCE, entrusted with organizing and implementing the elections, said that the Serbs who had fled to Yugoslavia and other countries could not vote in the countries and places to where they have emigrated.

Considering that the latter is only possible for Serbs who are willing to vote in the Croat-Muslim federation, it is clear that this is yet another defilement of the elections with which the so-called international community is trying to break up the Serb constituency; to get as few Serbs as possible to vote, or at least not to vote in the Serb Republic, so that the Croats and Muslims can win the greatest number of seats in its state institutions; and to show that there are far fewer Serbs in the Serb Republic than there really are, with the ultimate goal of weakening its postelection position and the positions of patriotic parties that are struggling to achieve the greatest possible degree of the Serb Republic's independence over its avowed enemies, the Croats and Muslims.

According to the information given by the Commissariat for Refugees of Serbia, there are around 230,000 Bosnian refugees in Yugoslavia, most of them Serbs, who are entitled to vote at the upcoming elections, and, at the same time, their number in third countries is no less that several tens of thousands.

One should consider that the traditional Serb indifference to their own destiny, "spiced with the apathy of Belgrade's policy and the military defeat in the western Serb democratic" elections, could abuse the authority that was given to it on the basis of the Dayton agreement and could deprive the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina of at least 100,000 or 200,000 votes.

It is not necessary to explain all the consequences that this might have on the final results of the elections and the balance of power in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the elections. We only need to remind you of the possibility of the Serbs losing the elections in certain areas in the Serb Republic where the Serbs were the majority by a thin margin before the war. The United States and its western European helpers will do everything to enable as many Croats and Muslims as possible to vote in such areas, even if it means accusing the Serbs of another Merkale incident, staged in the meantime.

Serbia

In the existing conditions, with election rules that are not, the destiny of the Serb Republic depends on the

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votes of the Serbs that are currently living on its territory, on what Serbia and Montenegro will do, and on how much national pride and fire still burns in the Serbs that fled from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Serbs from the Serb Republic can only be sure that they are voting for the Serb Republic if they vote for the SDS and the Serbian Radical party. Regardless of true patriotic motives, every vote given to parties of the left, citizens' parties, or insignificant parties may become a vote in support of the hegemonistic Islamic ideas of Alija Izetbegovic and the Ustasha plans of Tudjman's camarilla.

The Serb Republic has no financial and technical possibilities to encourage the refugee constituency and allow them to come to their registered voting stations. This can only be done with the immense efforts of the authorities and media in Serbia and Montenegro. This is an excellent chance for Belgrade to break its series of catastrophic moves that have hit the Serbs west of the Drina River very hard and a chance to contribute to the further strengthening of the Serb Republic's statehood and, in doing so, to eradicate all consequential psychological barriers raised between the two parts of the Serb nation.

However, past experience has shown that there is also a realistic possibility that official Belgrade will forego the general national interest in favor of its personal and party interests and that Belgrade's evaluation that the majority of the 200,000 refugee votes would go to the SDS (especially pronounced among the top members of the Socialist Party of Serbia) will not tip the scales in favor of the survival of the Serb Republic over an election victory of the left and a desired defeat of the SDS.

Regardless of whether the Serbs will hit against the Serbs again, or whether Belgrade will organize a media campaign to mobilize the masses of refugees to vote in the September elections, it would be extremely important for the traditional Serb stubbornness to awaken, and, in spite of all the financial and psychological barriers, for the Bosnian Serb refugees in Yugoslavia and third countries, guided by the historical interests of their nation and civilization, to come to their home towns and villages in the Serb Republic, or as close to them as possible, and to fulfill their civic duties and, above all, their national duties, and vote.

That would be an honorable act and the best possible expression of respect for the heroic struggle of their people and the tens of thousands of those who, for the sake of a better future for their children, courageously made the choice to die a martyr's death for the good of the Serb state—the Serb Republic. At the same time, it would be a true reconciliation between the Serbs who, during the war, remained on the left bank of the Drina River and those who, due to moments of weakness, unfortunate circumstances, or for some other reason, crossed over to the right bank.

B-H: SMP Says SDS Organizing 'Brutal Attacks' on Opposition

AU0508152096 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 5 Aug 96

[Report by Branislav Bozic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bozic] Over the past three days, activists and public rallies of the SMP [Alliance for Peace and Progress] have been the target of brutal attacks in various parts in the Serb Republic, a statement handed to journalists today in Banja Luka reads and provides details: On 2 August two members of the municipal committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] in Zvornik attacked Socialist Party activists Dragan Pesic and Budimir Acimovic. Pesic was injured and Acimovic's car was damaged. Yesterday in Brcko, at a hall where the SMP were holding a campaign rally, two explosive devices were found. Furthermore, yesterday in the village of Ljeskove Vode near Doboj, where an Alliance campaign rally was taking place, a cluster bomb was thrown into the crowd, but luckily no one was injured. These incidents, as well as many that occurred last spring, have been reported to the police authorities, but so far none of those responsible has been caught, it was said today by Dragutin Ilic, the main candidate on the list for the Serb Republic assembly and deputy chairman of the Socialist Party. Ilic also said: We are convinced that these incidents are being orchestrated by the ruling Serb Democratic Party, deliberately and systematically. Although Aleksa Buha and Biljana Plavsic have frequently issued statements that the authorities will prevent incidents of that kind, Ilic believes that in this case there is a discrepancy between what the authorities are saying and what is happening in reality. Because of all this, the SMP, a coalition of five left-wing parties, will again be addressing the top authorities in the Serb Republic, as well as the international organizations in charge of the implementation and supervision of the elections. We are not happy that we have to turn to the international community for protection, but we are compelled to do so, because not a single incident has been resolved so far, while these brutal attacks are happening increasingly frequently, Ilic said. There are even indications, he claims, that groups are being organized and tasked with liquidating SMP officials and activists.

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B-H: SRNA Reports Bridge Over Usora River 'Destroyed'

AU0208205296 Paris AFP in English 2044 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 2 (AFP)—A newly-built bridge in the zone that separates the two halves of Bosnia-Herzegovina was destroyed with dynamite on Friday, the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency reported.

In a dispatch monitored in Belgrade, it said the "act of diversion" by unknown persons took place at 6:15 p.m. (1615 GMT) at the bridge that spans the Usora river, near the towns of Doboj and Tesanj in Bosnia's northeast.

It added that a Danish batallion attached to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) has its base about 100 meters (yards) from the bridge.

The area in which the incident took place is under the supervision of a mixed Scandinavia and Polish IFOR brigade, the news agency said, adding that IFOR had issued no communique about the blast.

The zone of separation lies between the two entities in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina—the Muslim-Croat Federation on one side, and the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] on the other.

B-H: 'Extremist Serbs' Blamed for Blowing Up Doboj Bridge

LD0208223296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have just received the following information: Despite the apparently tightened security measures and the increased presence of IFOR [Implementation Force] in the zone of responsibility of the Multinational Division North, a strong explosion occurred in the Doboj area [northern Bosnia] controlled by the Nordic-Polish brigade at approximately 1820 this evening. The explosion took place in the area of the quarry, close to the former zoo, at the estuary near Doboj. Our correspondent Miralem Begic has managed to gather more information:

[Begic] The strong explosion heard this evening is proof that the Serb extremists in Doboj do not accept the recently renewed traffic on the Sarajevo-Doboj-Tuzla road which now goes through the town of Doboj after the opening of the bridge at the estuary only a little less than a month ago.

The local extremist Serbs blew up a newly completed, prefabricated bridge across the sewage canal in the region of Vira, only 100 meters away from IFOR's [word indistinct]. IFOR also guards the bridge on the River Usora. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serbs Block IFOR Troops Pursuing Bridge-Bombing Suspects

AU0308132996 Paris AFP in English 1112 GMT 3 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 3 (AFP)—A crowd of Bosnian Serbs twice came to the aid of suspects fleeing a NATO military police patrol who gave chase after a bridge was blown up, NATO officials said Saturday.

The military police patrol from the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) spotted a car fleeing the scene of a bomb blast that badly damaged a small bridge near Doboj, northern Bosnia.

"Shortly after the explosion military police spotted a red car which they suspected of having been at the bridge when it was damaged. As the MP moved towards that vehicle a crowd of some 200-300 converged on the scene and allowed the car and occupants to leave," said Major Brett Boudreau, an IFOR spokesman.

Four hours later another patrol spotted the same vehicle at a different location but lost it again when "it proceeded to drive in among a crowd of about 1,000 civilians celebrating a religious holiday," Boudreau said.

Bosnian Serb police at the scene made no attempt to assist the MPs, the spokesman added.

The bridge was constructed by Romanian troops serving with IFOR but is not the only crossing over the river Usora. Movement in the area is still possible, Boudreau said.

B-H: Serbs Accuse IFOR Troops of Plundering Depot

LD0508212296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2135 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sokolac, 5 Aug (SRNA)—Members of the IFOR Italian Brigade, under the command of Colonel Dobs [name as received], today forced their way into a military warehouse in the village of Margetici near Sokolac and completely plundered it, after which residents of Sokolac blocked the road with their bodies, cars, and anything else they had, thus forcing the Italians to return what they had plundered.

A more serious conflict between the 4-5,000 citizens of Sokolac and the members of the Italian Brigade was narrowly avoided.

A representative of the Serb Republic Army's General Staff, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, thanked

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the citizens of Sokolac for their exemplary behavior and the Italian Col. Dobs publicly apologized on a loudspeaker and said that the whole thing was a misunderstanding.

An incident was avoided because the residents of Sokolac once again demonstrated their humanity and hospitality, and confirmed their unity by working together for the same cause, irrespective of their political persuasion.

B-H: Italian Troops Seize, Return Munitions Near Sarajevo

LD0608085596 Rome RAI Radio Uno Network in Italian 0800 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Detachments of Italian troops from the multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia, IFOR, have found a munitions deposit measuring 1,200 cubic meters in the area of Sokalac, 46 km east of Sarajevo. The soldiers confiscated the munitions, loading them onto four trucks. The convoy was stopped on the outskirts of Sokalac by at least 300 people. Two officers from the Bosnian Serb army explained to the commander of the Italian forces that a request for authority for the deposit had been sent over the last few days to IFOR. After checks, the commander found that the request was indeed under consideration by IFOR, and the munitions were taken back to where they came from. The deposit was placed under surveillance.

B-H: Serbs Reportedly Request Authorization of Arms Dumps

AU0608124496 Paris AFP in English 1215 GMT 6 Aug 96

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 6 (AFP)—NATO forces have discovered a massive arms cache belonging to the Bosnian Serb army which has also asked to declare another 20 sites where arms are stored, NATO officials said Tuesday.

Around 2,000 tonnes [metric tons] of mines, rockets, and ammunition were discovered in a boarded up building in eastern Bosnia Monday morning, a spokesman for the Alliance-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) said.

Under strict rules in Bosnia's peace agreement all storage sites belonging to the former warring factions should have been declared to IFOR last March. IFOR has the right to destroy all unauthorised weaponry.

IFOR spokesman Major Brett Boudreau said that Monday's find "does not appear to be an authorised site."

In an apparent act of contrition, around the same time Monday, the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) also asked for more than 20 arms dumps in the vicinity to be authorised by the peacekeepers.

This sudden revelation of additional sites presents IFOR with a difficult choice over whether to confiscate the weaponry. Such action would likely prompt a major stand-off with the Serbs.

Earlier on Monday, when Italian troops tried to take away some four truck loads of arms, a crowd of 4-500 civilians blocked their path. Trucking away 2,000 tonnes of ammunition would take days, NATO officers admitted.

"Over the course of the day we will inspect those (additional) sites and make a decision whether to confiscate the lot," Boudreau said.

The initial find was discovered by a team of Italian troops looking at possible polling sites for Bosnia's forthcoming elections, an Italian IFOR officer told AFP. "They noticed this boarded up building and an old man sitting outside guarding the place. When the soldiers asked him what was in the building the man said 'nothing, it's an old school,'" IFOR spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Iacono said. On close inspection though the massive stockpile was discovered. "That's when things started to get a little difficult," the IFOR officer said.

The 30 Italian troops sent to collect the initial find were blocked just outside the Serb-held town of Sokolac, some 40 kilometers (25 miles) northeast of Sarajevo, Iacono said.

Boudreau said it was possible the sites were already declared but that inaccuracies with maps had led to the apparent chance find. Only 95 percent of "hundreds" of weapons storage sites declared last March had been inspected by IFOR, he added. In explaining the apparent contradictions Boudreau denied that Monday's find and request to declare other sites was a clear case of the Serbs coming clean after they were caught red-handed.

"We would not say this was an attempt to hide these weapons from us. We are dealing with a large country of terrain that is rough and rugged. The administration of their (Serb) sites is hampered by communications and by command and control and by going through four years of conflict," the spokesman said.

One patrol was left overnight outside the arms dump which had no military markings and only one civilian keeping watch Iacono said. "This was not a suitable site for the storage of ammunition. There were houses close by. With 1,200 cubic meters (yards) of ammunition this would be extremely dangerous," Iacono said.

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B-H: Serbs Protest Attempts To Hinder Exhumation of Bodies

LD0208164096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1330 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 2 Aug (SRNA)—The government of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic today lodged an official protest with Michael Steiner, deputy to the international high representative [Carl Bildt], regarding Muslim and Croat attempts to hinder exhumation of bodies from mass graves and the burial of Serb soldiers specifically in Glamoc and on Mt Ozren.

Following today's meeting with Steiner in Pale, Velibor Ostojic, the deputy prime minister in charge of social affairs, said that the Serb side stressed that "it can no longer tolerate the other side's attempts to manipulate the families of missing persons and humanitarian activities."

"We are especially concerned by statements made by Alexander Ivanko [Implementation Force spokesman], who regards any exhumation in the Serb Republics as part of a criminal investigation," Ostojic said, and added: "Mr. Steiner took on board our arguments, and we took on board his suggestions and views. It seems to me that today we have reached several conclusions, which could prove to be steps in the right direction."

According to Ostojic, "we have agreed on joint activities, which will allow members of the families of missing persons to take an even more active role in the search for their nearest and dearest."

Talks with representatives of the international police force will be held in the next few days so that the best formula for their active participation in these activities is found.

"We have also agreed that the 25 June Banja Luka document provides solid foundations, and we insist that cases it set in motion be completed. The implementation of the agreement, specifically in the areas of Glamoc and Mt. Ozren, around 5 August, will open up possibilities for a further resolution of these problems," the deputy prime minister said, and added:

"The Serb Republic government insists on equal treatment of all sides and it believes that these are purely humanitarian issues. We have suggested to Steiner that a top-level meeting regarding the issue of missing persons, exhumation of bodies and exchange [of bodies] be held."

The talks will be followed by a meeting of the presidents of the [Bosnian] Serb and Croat-Muslim commissions for [the] exchange [of missing persons and bodies], which will review the technical details of the talks.

Ostojic stressed that Michael Steiner, who invested huge efforts to reach these conclusions, made a big contribution. He added that Serb Republic government members who took part in the talks contributed to their successful completion, in line with the government's conclusions.

Michael Steiner, the deputy to the high representative, confirmed that the meeting with the Serb Republic government delegation was "very important."

"We know that the families of missing persons are very worried. The search for these people is slow for various reasons. We must all work on speeding it up. This is why we recently reached an agreement in Banja Luka, which all sides are respecting. The wish was expressed again for that humanitarian agreement to be implemented fully," Steiner said.

In addition to Deputy Prime Minister Ostojic and Michael Steiner, the meeting in the Serb Republic government was attended by Minister for Health Dragan Kalinic.

B-H: Serbs, Muslims Hold Talks on Exhumation of Bodies

LD0208220496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1708 GMT 2 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 2 Aug (SRNA)—Dragan Bulajic, president of the state commission of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic for the exchange of war prisoners, held talks today in Pale with Amor Masovic, chairman of the Muslim commission, on the continuation of the process of exhuming mass graves.

After the meeting Bulajic told SRNA that they discussed technical details of the conclusion of the already begun exhumations of the graves at Glamoc [western Bosnia] and on Mt. Ozren. The Croat and Muslim sides halted these exhumations, thus violating the recently signed agreement in Banja Luka. [passage omitted]

"It is the duty of the international community to enable the continuation of the already started task, and we expect [Michael] Steiner [deputy coordinator of the international civilian operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina] to put pressure on the Muslims and Croats to respect the set deadline," he said.

Bulajic said that the meeting with the Muslim representative was very useful and added that on Saturday, 3 August, a local meeting will be held to solve the problem of the exhumation of the mass grave in Banovici [northern Bosnia].

"It was also agreed to solve the problem in the immediate future of persons who are in prisons and who have not been indicted for war crimes," Bulajic said.

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Croatia: Government To Continue Efforts To Find Solution

LD0408224996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 4 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As no success has been achieved so far in the attempts to find a solution for the establishment of the local authorities in Mostar, the Croatian side has put forward a proposal whose content is very similar to previous proposals made by the EU.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia announced tonight that, in an attempt to find a compromise, Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, had talks with Dick Spring, president of the EU Council of Ministers; German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel; and John Kornblum, assistant to the U.S. secretary of State.

The ministry's announcement adds that the Republic of Croatia will continue its attempts to find a solution in line with the Washington and Dayton agreements and the strengthening of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Zagreb Said To Face U.S., EU Sanctions Over Mostar

AU0508144996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 5 Aug 96

[Report by Nada al Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb must achieve three things with the Herzegovina Croats—get them to abolish the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, to accept the EU's solutions for Mostar, and to assist with the implementation of the Federation. If this is not done, Croatia will have sanctions slapped on it even harsher than those formerly enforced against Serbia. This is, in short, the gist of last night's messages to Croatia from the United States, Germany, and the EU.

Diplomats in the know in Zagreb say that Granic's telephone conversations last night with Kinkel, Kornblum, and Spring were very extensive and unpleasant, that he was issued warnings and Croatia issued threats, and that the Croatian minister responded with the usual generalized statement made so many times before that Croatia would do everything that it could.

The three diplomats only reiterated Bill Clinton's ultimatum to Tudjman made three days ago in Washington. Of course, upon returning to Zagreb, Dr. Tudjman tried to present this as yet another great success for Croatian policy, since he was supposed to have discussed Bosnia-Herzegovina with Bill Clinton as a partner. However, Western diplomatic sources in Zagreb and the opposition reject this and, as a German adviser at the Germany Embassy put it, the entire trip was sheer torture for Tudjman, since the United States did not appeal to Croatia for anything, but very sternly warned it that sanctions would be on the cards unless Bosnia, and particularly Mostar, were at peace.

Will Croatia dare to ignore these U.S. threats? The Zagreb correspondent of the Italian PICCOLO newspaper fears just this. In his report he says that he fears Croatian arrogance and other frightening things. For the Italian colleague, one of these frightening things is the election slogan of Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union, as he put it, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which promises that the Croats will have their capital city of Mostar in the heart of Bosnia and this kind of statement makes the blood of the most cold-blooded diplomat boil, so just imagine what it does to the Bosniaks.

Croatia: Tudjman's U.S. Visit Described as 'Not Successful'

LD0308153496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to information carried today by the BBC, based on a statement by the White House spokesman, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman promised during his talks with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Washington to use his influence with the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to make his contribution to the normalization of relations in Mostar. The same source reports that Croatia will recognize the results of the Mostar elections.

The first assessments by the Croatian political scene are that the visit of President Tudjman to the United States was not successful. One [words indistinct] of the Croatian Government has said that U.S. President Clinton made an ultimatum and demanded the suspension of Herzeg-Bosnia, but Tudjman's response was vague. Nada al Issa, correspondent of BH Press, reports from Zagreb:

[Al Issa] Even the statement made by Mr. Tudjman himself upon his return to Zagreb confirms that the visit did not produce the results he, at least, expected. The president, visibly worried, first said that the friendship between Croatia and the United States was made even stronger, that he obtained a confirmation from the United States that Croatia was, as he said, in Europe and not in the Balkans. Only after this did he briefly mention that the joint Croatian-U.S. efforts would be made to strengthen the [Muslim-Croat] federation. It was because of the federation that President Tudjman was, as is well known, summoned to the United States suddenly and urgently on the evening of 31 July.

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A very senior member of the Croatian Government told us today, naturally under the condition that he remain anonymous, that President Clinton put an ultimatum on the suspension of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, but Dr. Tudjman made a very vague response. What will happen if the federation does not begin to function, which is to say, if this parastate is not suspended, was actually explained by President Tudjman himself when he admitted in his statement for the Croatian media that Clinton warned him about the catastrophe in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in his words, if the federation did not begin to function, and that Croatia must, because it can, prevent this catastrophe.

Furthermore, our source says that he has very reliable information that sanctions, even more severe than on Serbia, will be imposed on Croatia if it does not suspend this parastate. However, he says the mood is such right now that Croatia will sooner accept such sanctions than the suspension of the parastate it created itself.

This is confirmed to a degree by the first reaction from the Croatian opposition after Tudjman's return from the United States. Stipe Mesic, chairman of the Croatian Independent Democrats, said—I quote—the whole problem is that the whole world wants to preserve a united Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia wants the opposite; it wants to keep both the world and the so-called Herzeg-Bosna, which is to say a divided Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is why, Mesic says, the visit to Washington could not have been successful.

Croatia: Granic Says Croatia Will Never Be 'Balkan' Country

LD0308140196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gorana Jerkovic reports from Neum, where the fourth assembly of the Bosnian HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] continues.

[Begin recording] [Jerkovic] The vice chairmen of the HDZ, Mate Granic [Croatian foreign minister] and Gojko Susak [Croatian defense minister] joined in the work of the fourth assembly of the Bosnian HDZ in Neum. Addressing the deputies, Mate Granic said, among other things:

[Granic] Our goals are clear. As a Mediterranean and central European country, the Republic of Croatia wishes to develop its economic and political interests within this framework. On the other hand, our aspirations can only be euro-atlantic aspirations. We do not want any links within the framework of the Balkan or any other institutions and we do not want to be imposed any conditions for joining euro-atlantic institutions. As Minister Prlic said, this is the only interest of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jerkovic] Mate Granic also dwelt on yesterday's visit to the United States:

[Granic] The purpose of President Tudjman's visit to the United States was to coordinate the most important strategic interests, i.e. that Croatia should be recognized as a country which belongs to western civilization, as a country of central Europe, as a country which will not accept any conditions in order to join euro-atlantic institutions, and which will not have any links with some [Balkan] institutions. I think this is the biggest achievement of President Tudjman's visit to the United States. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Rumors of Granic's 'Imminent Resignation' Reported

LD0408144996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the political scene in Croatia, political and in-party disagreements between the so-called right and left of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] are becoming increasingly sharp. Mate Granic, the popular minister of foreign affairs, seems to have incurred most wrath because of his conflict with Defense Minister Gojko Susak. This has given rise to rumors of Granic's imminent resignation or even dismissal. BH PRESS correspondent from Zagreb Nada al-Issa reports:

[al-Issa] These are the rumors: If Tudjman has really decided to disband the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, he will have to get rid of its creator, Minister Gojko Susak. If, on the other hand, he insists on preserving it despite everything, the popular Granic will have to go. The main question now is which side President Tudjman will take—the side of those supporting the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia and, by implication, a divided Bosnia and Minister Susak, or of those advocating a united Bosnia and Minister Granic. Granic is out of favor precisely because of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia. If it were up to him, he would have disbanded it immediately after Dayton, but Minister Susak would not have it. This is why they clashed.

This was confirmed directly by the usually cautious Granic, who said in an interview that he is already feeling embarrassed because of the failure to keep promises given to the international community. On many of his diplomatic trips abroad, he promised that Croatia will definitely disband the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia. However, Zagreb has regularly failed to keep his promises. As a result, Granic has lost trust and reputation as a serious diplomat. At least, this is what is being said.

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A real witch-hunt is going on in Croatia and in the HDZ media against Granic at the moment because he is allegedly having an 800 square meter villa built for himself in the most prestigious part of Zagreb at the expense of the state. Granic himself insists that the rumors originate from the so-called Herzegovina lobby which, for obvious reasons, would gladly dispense with the popular minister who refuses to recognize their parastate in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serious politicians here insist that the possible departure of the popular Granic would mean the departure of the last member of the Croatian leadership who genuinely favors a united Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia: Daily Sees Muslims as Hindering Federation

AU0608102896 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 Aug 96 p 2

[Commentary by Jozo Pavkovic: "Federation as Historic Necessity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The past week was marked by several events that were very important for the future political creation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both world and Bosnia-Herzegovina politicians were most of the time demanding a solution from the Croatian top state leadership. Several meetings have been held in Zagreb and the conclusions reached have almost completely been corroborated in the talks between presidents Franjo Tudjman and Bill Clinton.

It goes without saying that these events made an impact on the work of the 4th Convention of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Members of that party have once again confirmed their support for the agreement on the Federation as a historic necessity that is not the best solution but is much better than many alternatives. The SDA [Party of Democratic Action], however, considers the project to be a way of reaching its goals and has acquired a completely triumphant approach to it. In all that, the Muslims have seen a means of reaching their goal, the creation of a state in which the majority people would rule. And precisely in this way, the SDA is hindering the Federation project. However, the pressures by the international community are directed toward Zagreb rather than Sarajevo.

Speaking at the convention yesterday about unprecedented pressures on the Croatian people, Federation President Kresimir Zubak pointed out that the functions of Herzeg-Bosnia will be transferred onto Croatia the moment the transfer is possible. Therefore, if one is to judge on the basis of the atmosphere at the 4th Convention of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not dispute 8 August, the date suggested by the White House to be the deadline by which the Herzeg-Bosnia structures must be integrated into the Federation. During that time, the essential strategic processes for the Croatian people will be established. The efforts that the Croatian side has been investing into a complete implementation of the Dayton agreement will have no success if the process is not simultaneously joined by the Muslim partner, whose only goal at the moment is to abolish Herzeg-Bosnia and thereby cause anarchy among the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia: UN Spokesman Says Amnesty Law Must Be Comprehensive

LD0108181296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1722 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, 1 Aug (TANJUG)—Philip Arnold, UN transitional administration spokesman, said on Radio Yugoslavia Thursday that the Coatian amnesty law should be made comprehensive and brought in line with international law, as urged by the UN Security Council on 3 July.

Arnold said Jacques Klein, UN administrator of the East Slavonia, Baranja, and West Srem region was regularly raising the issue with authorities in Zagreb.

He noted that the same was being done by the international community, through the Council of Europe, and the French, U.S., German, and Austrian Governments, individually.

Arnold noted that the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] mandate called for the region's peaceful transition to Croatian rule.

He said the UN Security Council would take into consideration the positions of the Croatian Government and the Serb side when deciding whether to extend the UNTAES mandate after 15 January next year.

Arnold said it was unrealistic to expect any talks on the region's broader political autonomy, seperate currency, legislation, or flag.

The East Slavonia, Baranja, and West Srem region is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina which has not been occupied by Croatia.

Croatia: Official Views Voter Registration for B-H Elections

AU0108141396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jul 96 p 6

[Interview with Damir Zoric, president of the National Coordination Board for the Implementation of the

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Bosnia-Herzegovina elections on the territory of Croatia, by Tifani Simunovic; place and date not given: "The Deadline Is 5 August"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the territory of Croatia, the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who find themselves in our country have started to register to vote in the autumn elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apart from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the National Coordination Board headed by Damir Zoric, head of the Government's Office for Displaced and Refugees, is in charge of the implementation of the elections on the territory of Croatia.

Dual Citizenship

[Simunovic] Who has the right to vote in Croatia for the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zoric] All the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, all other citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina with permanent or temporary residence in the Republic of Croatia, and all persons born in Bosnia-Herzegovina can vote.

[Simunovic] Among the many documents that can serve as evidence of one's citizenship, there is also the so-called statutory statement.

[Zoric] One uses it only if none of some 10 documents listed can be presented. That is, an ordinary public document that can be checked on in some other place.

Refugee File

[Simunovic] Why is a refugee document not enough for voter registration?

[Zoric] A refugee document is enough to prove one's identity, but it is not enough to prove the right to vote. All citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who have permanent or temporary residence in Croatia will have the right to vote, but only if they have applied with the prescribed application forms by 5 August. It seems that this is not clear enough to the people, but not only to them. Namely, no party in Croatia, apart from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], has shown any interest in us, as the competent body for the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections in Croatia, which is simply difficult to believe regarding both the number of the voters from Bosnia-Herzegovina present in Croatia the Croatian parties' lively expression of interest in the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the last couple of years. The implementation of the elections does not only represent the fulfillment of our international obligation toward the citizens of the other state. Those elections are in the national interest of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also of all of us in the Republic of Croatia.

[Simunovic] What about informing the voters about the elections?

[Zoric] Many people who come to register ask us about the election lists, candidates, and similar things. Unfortunately, we cannot give them answers to those questions because we represent only a technical service for the preparation and implementation of the elections. The parties should be giving the electorate the answers to those justified questions. Since the majority of the Croatian parties have "sister" parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and vice versa, I see the possibility of providing better information for the electorate.

How Much Money to the Others?

[Simunovic] What difficulties are possible in the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections in Croatia?

[Zoric] People do not fully understand that they have to register by 5 August. Apart from that, the logistical responsibility for the implementation of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not lie only with us, but also with the OSCE. What am I to do if I am informed today that we have only 2,000 application forms for those people who want to vote in Bosnia-Herzegovina and my information shows that the demand for application forms is far greater? What am I to do when the printing shop appointed by the OSCE delivers the application forms with wrong serial numbers, which is strictly forbidden, so that we have to send them back? How can I raise sufficient financial means, when we are not allocated enough by the OSCE? What am I to do with the working capacity of the employees of the Office for Displaced and Refugees, who have a whole heap of everyday chores to do apart from the implementation of these elections?

At the same time, we read agency reports saying that the OSCE will give party coalitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina $60,000 each, and that even the independent candidates will be given $11,000 each.

[Simunovic] In Croatia, the means intended for the implementation of these elections are not sufficient?

[Zoric] Slovenia has been approved $50,000, although it is accommodating 10,000 refugees, while we so far have been approved $35,000 and we have 177,000 registered refugees. Only two days before the end of the first registration term, and the deadline was 28 July, we received the current electoral register. It is not possible to install the whole network, educate people, and fill all the application forms in such a short time. If they want to refer to "badly informed refugees," I have nothing against it, but someone is deeply confused in all this.

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Mr. Tobias Wernle, the OSCE representative for the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections in Croatia, has helped us a lot, but he has been here for only three weeks now. In our opinion, he should have come here three months ago.

Security Measures

The rules envisage that it is also possible to register to vote on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What if 50,000 people apply to go and vote in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Who will pay for their transport? In Zagreb 55 men are dealing with the filling out of registration forms. Croatia convincingly surpasses all other countries in the number of places where voters can register. In Germany, where there are 320,000 refugees and, as far as I know, there is only one such place in Bonn, and the situation is similar in Sweden. Allegedly, there will be two such places in the United States. In Croatia, there are 18 basic regional coordination centers for the voters to register, which are also opening branch offices.

[Simunovic] What security measures have been implemented to prevent abuse, and who will control the polling stations in Croatia?

[Zoric] The polling stations will be secured by the members of MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. The transport of all materials will be escorted. All jobs connected to the implementation of the elections can be done only by persons authorized to do so by the coordination board, and the same applies to the observers.

[Box, p 6]

Ban on Political Rallies

[Simunovic] Some media reproach you for saying that rallies by the political parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina will be forbidden on the territory of Croatia, while, at the same time, Fikret Abdic presented his party's program at a news conference in Zagreb.

[Zoric] I have said nothing like that, but that is the provision envisaged by the memorandum of understanding between the OSCE and us. This memorandum says that various political parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina will have no opportunity to be politically active in Croatia, which is perfectly logical. First of all, this refers to the organization of public meetings—that is, political rallies in Croatia. However, it is a fact that the OSCE demands that we provide an opportunity for all interested parties to talk to their voters, and this opportunity refers primarily to the accessibility of the media. Otherwise, we could ask ourselves whether, for instance, the statements made by Mr. Izetbegovic or Mr. Silajdzic for CNN or Sky News—which can be seen in Croatia—are a kind of political propaganda in Croatia. On the other hand, what about the journalist's right to obtain information? If, by any chance, we had banned Abdic's news conference, we would have forbidden journalists to obtain information. Apart from that, the National Coordination Board is not entitled to impose sanctions, but only the OSCE Provisional Election Commission in Sarajevo can do that.

Croatia: E. Slavonian Serb Official Warns of Serb Exodus

AU0508175996 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the provincial executive council, has been receiving a group of about 30 foreign reporters in Vukovar. This is the second day they have been visiting eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem [Serb name for Srijem]. Their visit was organized by UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia].

In the introductory part of the one-hour briefing, Stanimirovic introduced the foreign reporters to the situation in the province following the four months of intensive implementation of the Erdut-Zagreb agreement.

[Unidentified correspondent] The issue in which the foreign reporters were most interested was that of autonomy, that is, the province's special status, amnesty for the participants of war, relations with Belgrade, war crimes, and the possibility of an exodus of the people from this area.

Asked about autonomy, the province's prime minister said that the people in the province were not interested in any kind of cultural autonomy, but rather a special status, adding that this issue had been raised by the Vukovar municipal assembly, while the provincial assembly had issued a declaration on the special status, in which demands were made for a 12-month extension of the UNTAES mandate, demilitarized province [words indistinct], the right to local self-management in accordance with article 12 of the Erdut agreement, [words indistinct] executive authorities in the legislature and the judiciary, the province's own police, media system, and so on.

"The truth about this province is that the Croatian Democratic Union did not win here, the results of the so-called referendum for independent and sovereign Croatia were not (?favorable for Croatia)," he said, reminding the reporters that it was the Serbs who had suffered first in Vukovar: Serbs who held managerial positions were

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replaced by way of decrees that arrived from Zagreb. There then followed arrests and harassment, which led to the forming of lines of refugees. "As head of the psychiatry ward in the Vukovar hospital, I was one of those who suffered," said the prime minister, proceeding to explain to the reporters that he had been arrested, interrogated, and harassed. "I claim that my only crime was that I was a Serb and a member of a certain party," said Dr. Stanimirovic, adding that this had been followed by Serbs being excluded from the Croatian Constitution, which resulted in a Serb defense being organized and led to all the events that started in Borovo Selo.

Asked about war crimes, the prime minister said that the provincial government supported the work of the Hague Tribunal and that war criminals on both sides should receive the punishment that they deserve.

Rounding up the one-hour briefing, prime minister Stanimirovic emphasized that the provincial government would make a particular effort to have the people stay here at all costs, since, he said, this land belongs to these people. "We have to talk to Mr. Klein about the special status of this province. If we are not given the status, there is a possibility of a mass exodus," said Dr. Stanimirovic, emphasizing that the executive council [words indistinct] of the people, whatever (?they) may be.

"Our demands are realistic, and if there is a desire for these people really to stay here, the demands can easily be met," said Dr. Stanimirovic.

After the briefing in the provincial government building, in the afternoon Vukovar mayor Miroslav [second name indistinct] received the foreign reporters, who spent the rest of their visit in Baranja.

Croatia: E. Slavonia Assembly Head Sees 'Happier Times' Ahead

AU0208162396 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 29 Jul 96

[Interview with Borivoje Zivanovic, president of the Assembly of the "Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem," by Petko Koprivica, editor in chief of Beli Manastir Radio and Television; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Summary] Petko Koprivica begins the 30-minute special program by saying the discussion will focus on current political and economic issues of the "province." He asks Zivanovic his opinion about the "uncertain future of the Serb people" in view of conditions in the province since UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] has been in the area.

Zivanovic disagrees that the situation and future are uncertain, saying that "the mother country's principled policy has resulted in the achievement of peace" and has "brought recognition to the Federal Republic and restored its international reputation," thereby "creating conditions for cultural and economic prosperity in both the FRY, the Serb Republic, and the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem." He adds: "Recovery and development are in our hands; we now have peace," which is the crucial factor "in creating conditions for general prosperity in which individuals can have a free, dignified existence."

He also says the Erdut Agreement, "the only document our side has signed," is "very valuable capital that we must not waste." He continues: "It is extremely favorable for us and guarantees that we will stay in this area. We have voluntarily demilitarized, and we are sure there will be no military intervention in our area, as this is guaranteed by the international community, which must protect the people in this area and help us economically." Expanding on the province's good prospects, he emphasizes the importance of multiethnic Baranja, stating: "We must watch over it, and it will be a force for peace in the area."

Koprivica asks Zivanovic to comment on cooperation with UNTAES and cooperation of the provincial assembly in the peace process. Zivanovic says the Serb side has done everything that was demanded of them, adding that "everything Mr. Klein has achieved in the area is thanks to the Serb people." Talking about the demand to extend the UNTAES mandate another year, he says: "The UN forces represent the conditions necessary for economic recovery and prosperity, as well as for healing the war wounds." He adds: "When it comes to exercising the rights of the Serb people, we will support all the good intentions of the UNTAES." He thinks "there should no longer be any double standards, and what is agreed upon must be observed." He adds: "Local and regional authorities in the province must be fully acknowledged, as this is a condition for proper implementation of the agreement."

Koprivica asks whether the Erdut Agreement should be viewed as "accepting the so-called peaceful reintegration, as the Croatian side says," or as something that will "finally secure the permanent peace and prosperity of all citizens in this area." Zivanovic says "there is no mention of peaceful reintegration in any of the 14 articles of the agreement, and I appeal to the citizens in the province not to fall for propaganda in the Croatian media." He continues, saying that a month before the two-year mandate expires, at the latest, "local, provincial, and regional elections" will be held, and "since we

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are the majority here, we will certainly continue to be in power here."

Koprivica reads a viewer's question, asking "What right do Croats have to visit their houses in our province and to threaten the people who live in them now, all with a UNTAES escort?" Zivanovic says UNTAES should not be involved in such things and that a protest has been sent to General Klein concerning (Kaluza).

Another viewer comments that "many people no longer trust the authorities, many of whom have already secured for themselves and their families places to live in the FRY." Zivanovic replies that "in the coming period it will be necessary to draw the line and deal with people who misused their positions, war profiteers, and smugglers," adding that "war profiteering will certainly be discussed during an Assembly session, and a law will probably be passed on it." He acknowledges that "crime is present, especially in Belje company" and that the soldiers, who bore the brunt of the war, are in a bad position, but the issue will be dealt with. He continues: "The population's survival must be secured. If necessary, we will introduce restrictions so refugees and pensioners are taken care of." In that vein, he states that "2,800,000 dinars are missing from the retirement fund of the Beli Manastir municipality," a situation that will be addressed at an upcoming Assembly session. Commenting on the officials who have secured their existence in the FRY, Zivanovic says he has already demanded at a Beli Manastir municipal assembly session that "that all those who have built homes there and moved their property can no longer hold managerial positions." He states that over 50 percent of the land is uncultivated and that it should be distributed to the people, free of charge, for cultivation and so people will have an income.

Answering a question from Koprivica on the activities of the provincial assembly and its bodies and the immediate tasks of the parliament in the upcoming period, Zivanovic repeats that a law will soon be passed concerning war profiteers and crime. He adds that one of the primary tasks will also be cooperation with UNTAES "in consolidating and implementing this peace." He says that Gen. Klein and a delegation of the FRY secretariat for foreign affairs have been invited to the next assembly session, scheduled for Saturday in Vukovar, at which current problems will be discussed.

Koprivica says several viewers have asked for Zivanovic's views on the direct contacts between provincial authorities and Croatian officials concerning the UNTAES mission. Zivanovic says there must be contacts with neighbors, and in due time trade connections will probably be established.

Koprivica broaches the subject of the Croatian kuna's appearance in the area, asking whether this means the province is slowly being integrated into Croatia's monetary system. Zivanovic responds that the Erdut Agreement anticipates "the dinar as the only means of payment." He adds: "We are part of the FRY payment operations. We are economically dependent on our mother country," and "I hope that will continue to be the case."

Discussing the revitalization of the economy, Koprivica asks if there is enough financial support for such projects. Zivanovic responds: "UNTAES and Gen. Klein received our plans and program. They are trying to explain that right now the international community does not have the funds for such projects" and that the war is not the only reason for the present state of the economy. He goes on to expound on the incorrect attitudes and personal interests of certain persons being placed before the interests of the people.

Koprivica says he has received many questions regarding pensioners, who are in an extremely bad position. Zivanovic says he thinks "the local authorities bear exclusive responsibility for their plight."

Stating that Zivanovic is head of the provincial assembly, the highest legislative body in the area, Koprivica asks what they intend to do about establishing good legislation. Zivanovic replies that it is crucial that authorities perform well at all levels. He says a list must be drawn up of criminals who have stolen funds and taken them to the FRY, and a "demand must be made of the FRY that this property be sold and the money returned here." He says the tax and customs systems must be consolidated and indicates that these issues will be considered during Saturday's session.

Koprivica asks Zivanovic for his opinion on "the role and importance of the FRY, that is, the Repbulic of Serbia, as concerns implementation of the Erdut Agreement and the future of the province." He replies: "Yugoslavia is the guarantor of our stability; it is helping as much as it can." He adds: "Relying on the FRY, we cannot do more or better until (?sanctions are lifted)."

To conclude, Koprivica asks Zivanovic if he has a message for viewers. Zivanovic appeals "to everyone to return to their jobs" and not to "consider leaving, as there is no reason for it." He adds: "The agreement we have signed guarantees peaceful life, safety, and survival in this area. The whole world guarantees it. I think that when the time comes—and the international community will not be able to postpone providing economic aid to this area much longer—we will have better, happier times."

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Poland: Sejm Speaker on Concordat, Coalition, Early Elections

WS0508141796 Poznan WPROST in Polish 4 Aug 96 pp 17-18

[Interview with Polish Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych by Stanislaw Janecki and Marek Zieleniewski; place and date not given: "A Well-Cooperating Collective"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [WPROST] While supporting the idea of ratifying the Concordat, as recently as a few months ago you gave assurances that the Sejm would make the final decision on this issue by June. This did not happen, for which you were publicly criticized by Bishop Tadeusz Goclowski, among others. What is all this really about?

[Zych] What I raised was not the issue of the Concordat but the necessity of resolving a fundamental procedural problem. Since the Sejm obligated the extraordinary commission to submit a report (on or by 31 December 1995), it was necessary to know whether this date could be put off. After the commission asked the Sejm to postpone this date to 30 June 1996, it was logical for the Sejm to examine this motion by that day. As is known, the Sejm examined three draft laws and postponed the date. It is in this context that I spoke about June. I would also like to add that right now there are no substantive reasons to say that the issue should be discussed in the Sejm very soon. It should and will be discussed, but only when the Sejm is substantively prepared for that. Because the Sejm recently decided in a majority vote that the extraordinary commission is to submit its report soon after the referendum that will approve the new constitution, the following question arises: What led some people to believe (especially if we recall the three years of unsuccessful attempts to pass the Concordat) that the Sejm should resume the discussion of the Concordat after only three months, or perhaps even now?

[WPROST] The game that is going on around the Concordat is an element of a broader strategy. It is possible that one of the goals of that strategy was to exert influence on the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. Why would such pressure be applied? To hold early parliamentary elections or to obtain approval for such a distribution of ministerial portfolios in the new cabinet after the reform of the central government bodies that would be favorable to the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]?

[Zych] I believe that today our coalition partner is not at all interested in calling early elections. I do not rule out the possibility that they can be held at the least expected time and that it may result in surprises the SLD may be rather dissatisfied with. Nonetheless, I do not think the issue of the Concordat was linked to pressure exerted on the PSL. After all, the Concordat is not part of the coalition accord. Besides, our coalition partner has many other possibilities of exerting influence on the PSL, and I think it will use them.

[WPROST] Is it worthwhile to remain in this coalition at any price?

[Zych] I will say openly: The situation of the coalition is serious, which results from a number of problems—from the main principles of the state budget [for 1997] and problems related to the reform of the central government bodies, to issues related to the future reshuffle in the cabinet. I believe that right now it is the leading SLD activists who are more concerned about the possibility of the coalition crisis exacerbating. Thus, the PSL might have greater say as far as maneuver possibilities both in this coalition and in future configurations are concerned. If the coalition parties treat each other—and some important problems—as they have sometimes done, they might see results they would rather not see.

[WPROST] [PSL Chairman] Waldemar Pawlak has been very active on the political scene recently. Does this mean that the former prime minister has taken seriously a remark made by Lech Walesa, who said that the later you break up the coalition the worse result you will get in the parliamentary elections?

[Zych] Recently, we have seen some PSL deputies take steps that were incomprehensible to our electorate, such as the way some PSL deputies voted when the Sejm was deciding whether to pass a vote of no-confidence in Privatization Minister Kaczmarek. I also mean statements concerning the composition of the future cabinet, the way in which it should be formed, Poland's foreign policy and its road to the EU, and so forth. I believe that all of this affects people's opinions of the PSL, its leadership, and Waldemar Pawlak. Very frequently I come across the following questions: Do the PSL politicians know what they want? Do they have a platform and know what they want to see happen? I believe that the next congress of our party must resolve this issue in a clear-cut way. The party's platform must be contemporary, progressive, and present the PSL not only as a party linked to one social class, but also as a party of all Poles. This requires collective action. The SLD certainly does have a well-cooperating collective. I dare say that it is not in the interests of the PSL to run in early elections, even though the PSL may be a partner in a coalition on any side after such elections. As far as the PSL is concerned, the future of the coalition may be decided only by the Chief Council, not by any individual person.

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[WPROST] Do you think Waldemar Pawlak stands a chance of leading the PSL to the next parliamentary elections?

[Zych] This is up to the congress. It is difficult to say today because we are still at the stage of holding voivodship-level congresses. Nonetheless, it is already common knowledge that a few well-known colleagues are willing to run for the chairmanship of the party. In my view, the importance of the congress should not be associated with the resolution of personnel issues only. Today one needs to work primarily in a team. Everyone should make a positive contribution to the creation of the party's image. The organ that will lead the PSL to the elections is the Chief Council.

[WPROST] The opinion that the PSL is an "unreformable" party could recently be heard more and more often. Andrzej Olechowski [leader of the rightist "100 Movement"] went even as far as to say in an interview for WPROST that the PSL is a dangerous party. Does this mean that the situation in which the PSL has found itself in is not as favorable as Chairman Pawlak thinks it is?

[Zych] I absolutely cannot agree with such an opinion. The PSL is not an opponent of reforms. Sometimes my colleagues express all kinds of views, but this does not mean that this party is pursuing a policy that contradicts the interests of peasants or of the entire state. As Sejm speaker, I coordinate cooperation with the European Parliament in the area of our integration with the EU. The PSL is attributed a stand opposing integration with the EU because this integration would allegedly spell disaster for our agriculture. However, the situation is quite the contrary: I believe that the EU is a chance for us. Of course, I do have some reservations. It stands to reason that one has to know what the purpose of this integration is and how this issue should be raised. During the most recent conference of the heads of parliaments in Brussels, we discussed EU expansion, the results of the talks held by the intergovernmental commission, and the costs of this process. When things are presented frankly and when the real circumstances are not disregarded, it is possible to gain many things in negotiations and to come to common conclusions—for example, that adjustment of our agriculture to the principles binding in the EU will require at least 15 to 20 years (if the EU provides organizational and financial aid).

[WPROST] Do the EU countries agree to pay for the adjustment of our agriculture for such a long time?

[Zych] Such is the reality, and Western politicians are very well aware of that. Thus, why say it is necessary to immediately destroy 700,000 or 1.5 million farms? I would be the first to protest if things were going in the wrong direction, if integration led to a disaster in Poland and in the Polish countryside. I come from the countryside and I would not like to assume such responsibility. These issues must not be looked at from extreme points of view; they need to be presented to peasants objectively.

[WPROST] A large portion of society, especially people in towns, probably have a totally different view on the PSL.

[Zych] I am very sorry about that. After all, at the forum of parliament I present concrete arguments regarding integration. The PSL knows about this, and deputies also know about this. I do realize that PSL politicians are accused of thinking about their posts only, but this is not true. There are many deputies in the PSL club who know in which direction reforms should be further implemented so as not to impede transformations, but to yield benefits to the country and to rural areas. This is what they are doing.

[WPROST] Perhaps the image of the PSL as a party of preservers of the agricultural museum and of people seeking well-paid jobs might be changed if the PSL changed from a party of one class to a peasant party such as we can find in Scandinavia or Austria. Can the next congress do this?

[Zych] I can see some phenomena that are dangerous to the PSL, such as departure from the intelligentsia base. There was a time when we had many prominent scientists in Krakow; today they are complaining that no one needs them in the party. The same goes for young people. Now, after all, some people have to work on the party program; others must then put it into effect. It is extremely important to present a program in which there is room not only for peasants, but also for the intelligentsia. This is a program I want to propose at the congress—a program of transforming the PSL into a party with an all-national, Polish character.

[WPROST] Do you not fear that if it remains the last typically peasant party in Europe, the PSL may lose its electorate completely after some time?

[Zych] In the international arena we can see great interest in what the PSL is doing. Nonetheless, it is obvious that we must take a critical look at our electorate and problems of the countryside. If we want to be successful in the next century, we must alter our program and, particularly, we must implement it efficiently.

[WPROST] When do you think the parliamentary elections will be held in Poland?

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[Zych] This parliament should serve out its Constitutional term, which expires in the fall of 1997. What Poland needs is political stabilization—if only to adopt approximately 170 draft laws or to pass a new constitution. If, however, the coalition fails to reach agreement on vital issues, a crisis will arise as soon as the Cabinet reshuffles, once the regulations concerning the reform of the central government bodies come into force. A rift in the coalition might—after six months, for instance—lead to new parliamentary elections. They might be held next winter. I would like very much to prevent such an extreme scenario from taking shape. It must be admitted, however, that, whether they admit it or not, both coalition parties have been acting in concert to hold early elections. It is an entirely different story whether this will be beneficial to them.

Poland: More on Ambassadorial Selection Process

WS0508090096 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 27 Jul 96 pp 24-25

[Article by Ewa Wilk: "Operation of the Corps. Disagreement About Ambassadors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Poland still does not have a professional and apolitical diplomatic corps. This year's exchange of cadres, which will affect one-fourth of our foreign diplomatic missions, is causing emotions to run high.*

Jerzy Bahr, the first ambassador appointed by President Aleksander Kwasniewski, has already assumed his duties in Ukraine. Four others—Stefan Meller (Paris), Andrzej Bilik (Algiers), Roman Czyzycki (Lisbon), and Eugeniusz Noworyta (Buenos Aires)—are packing their suitcases. A further 10 diplomats who have passed the inquiry in front of the Sejm Commission for Foreign Affairs are awaiting only agrement [preceding word published in French] (approval) from the states where they have been designated to take their posts. On 27 August, the Sejm commission will interview Ewa Spychalska [chairwoman of the All-Polish Trade Union—OPZZ] and Andrzej Zalucki [deputy minister of defense] as candidates for ambassadors to....

That is it. Diplomatic custom does not allow disclosing the name of the country until the nomination has been signed by the president or before approval from the host state is obtained. The news has, however, leaked out. It is widely known that the OPZZ chairwoman is to take the post in Minsk [Belarus], and the current minister of defense, formerly deputy head of Jozef Oleksy's office, is headed for Moscow.

The uproar is mounting. Piotr Nowina-Konopka (of the Freedom Union) has already dubbed the coming nominations "crossing the Rubicon." Piotr Marciniak, one of the four members of the Sejm commission presidium, says that the atmosphere within the commission is getting "extremely bad," which is to be understood as a harbinger of a head-on confrontation between representatives of the coalition and the opposition on the commission by the end of August.

Numerous "ambassadorial lists" are circulating in the press. Real names are mixed with unconfirmed rumors or, to use the term used at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ], "hallway gossip." The lists suggest one thing: The coalition has launched an invasion of the diplomatic corps of the Republic of Poland, relying on human resources and methods of filling posts from the times of the Polish People's Republic [PRL].

Routine Earthquake

What is really going on in the Polish diplomatic service? The MSZ says: "Nothing, just the routine rotation of cadres." The custom of sticking to the four-year term for ambassadors, not written down anywhere but obeyed worldwide, forces a constant exchange of personnel in the diplomatic business.

How did the impression that an earthquake is taking place in Poland originate? First, ambassadors appointed by [former Foreign] Ministers Skubiszewski and Olechowski—diplomats from the so-called Solidarity pool—are currently returning to the country in huge numbers (because they were nominated in huge numbers after 1989). Some—for example, those posted to Chile, Algeria, France, and Zaire—are leaving after having served longer than the customary four years.

Moreover, posts in diplomatic missions as important as the one in Rome (where the ambassadorial chair has been empty for over a year), Lisbon (vacant for two years), or Moscow (where Stanislaw Ciosek, the only ambassador appointed during the times of the PRL, spent seven years), are now finally being staffed. These appointments were the subject of unending political squabbles between the former president and the governing coalition. The current president and the coalition do not squabble any more.

Therefore, apart from the 15 persons who are being sent abroad by President Kwasniewski, a further five to 10 nominations are expected by the end of this year. In all, nearly one-quarter of the diplomatic corps is to be replaced this year. Poland has 84 embassies, 37 consulates, 13 cultural institutes, and six permanent representation offices with ambassadorial status abroad.

The procedure of appointing ambassadors is not described in any Polish legal act. Only the small constitution states that the president has the right to nominate

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ambassadors. All of the remaining activities involved in appointing and aproving candidates are set by custom that is sometimes new and frail and may have only ritual meaning.

Both the requirement of obtaining the prime minister's countersignature and the inquiry before the Sejm commission are among the customs that were introduced back in the times of the PRL—rather for ornamental reasons because the foreign department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party decided about everything anyway. Although the preceding foreign ministers and the former president respected all of the elements of this procedure, it happened that a candidate was appointed ambassador despite a negative verdict from the commission. Marek Pernal, currently a much praised ambassador to the Czech Republic, was not approved by the coalition majority in the commission in May 1995, but he went to Prague at the request of Lech Walesa. At the time of the dispute between Minister Olechowski and Prime Minister Pawlak (over the "clean hands" campaign), the former president repeatedly announced that he would send ambassadors without the prime minister's countersignature, but he never kept his word.

Not Revealing Too Much

In the case of this year's nominations, everything has been going on without major obstacles, at least as far as meets the public eye. The prime minister has countersigned the nominations, and the coalition majority in the commission has approved the candidates. During those parts of the sessions that were open to journalists, [Commission] Chairman Bronislaw Geremek tempered attempts at revealing the lack of knowledge or ambassadorial predispositions of some candidates. According to a staffer from the office servicing the commission, he did so for the sake of the raison d'etat.

Still, there is no doubt that some candidates have passed the inquiry only because they had the support of the disciplined coalition majority in the commission. Only three candidacies were accepted unanimously by the coalition and the opposition: Stefan Meller (deputy foreign minister) to France, Krzysztof Mroziewicz (our colleague from POLITYKA) to India, and Jerzy Bahr (a department head at the MSZ) to Ukraine. In previous years, absolute agreement was equally rare and occurred, for example, in the case of Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who was sent as ambassador to Austria, and Jerzy Kozminski, who went to Washington.

Sporadically, some candidates were rejected. This year this has happened to Tomasz Lis, former head of Minister Skubiszewski's office, slotted to be ambassador in Rome already by [former Foreign Minister] Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. He failed because did not know any foreign languages, although it was said to be revenge of the coalition for foiling the plans of sending Jerzy Jaskiernia to Canada. (Incidentally, Tomasz Lis is taking over as consul general in New York).

Some observers of the commission sessions say that a feeling of resignation has recently dominated the debates. It stems from the belief that "the coalition will have its way anyway." In a sense, Piotr Marciniak confirms: "One might have the impression that we are presented not with candidacies to be judged, but with already-made decisions to be approved. This does not mean that we have not expressed our disappointment."

Various candidates have appeared in front of the commission. Some were diplomats who survived the times of the Solidarity ministers working at the MSZ, among them Boguslaw Kaczynski, Slawomir Dabrawa, Eugeniusz Noworyta, Roman Czyzycki, and Tadeusz Mulicki. Others stayed out of the ministry—for example, Jan Truszczynski. Professor Eufemia Teichman from the Main School of Commerce [SGH] has confessed a lack of knowledge about the art of diplomacy. The commission has interviewed Bronislaw Klimaszewski, former head of LOT [Polish Air Lines] and adviser to Roman Jagielinski [deputy prime minister and agriculture minister]. Publicists like Mroziewicz, Maciej Gorski from Interpress [Press Agency], and Andrzej Bilik, remembered for having worked for television during the Martial Law regime, have presented their own visions of their service. Who has turned out to be a disappointment? "It is difficult to say that all of the candidates with long years of experience as PRL diplomats have turned out to be a disappointment," says Marciniak. "Anyhow, their past is not the point. Some of them, though, have really outdated visions of the world. It can hardly be said that someone who has no diplomatic experience cannot make a good ambassador. One day two publicists were answering our questions—Krzysztof Mroziewicz and Maciej Gorski from Interpress. The difference in competence was stunning."

Distribution Centers

The course and the results of the commission inquiries have, as it was pointed out, only symbolic meaning. Decisions are made elsewhere.

Formally, candidates for ambassadors are appointed by the minister of foreign affairs. This practice was followed by all three preceding ministers of the Republic of Poland [after the year 1989]. As it is being estimated now, most successful nominations and embarassing "accidents" are to be attributed to them personally. Lech Walesa only gave his blessing.

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Unlike his predecessors, [Foreign] Minister Dariusz Rosati usually does not appear at the commission sessions to present his candidates. This is said to be no coincidence. Many of those with whom we spoke indicated that the minister could be fimer on staffing issues and that he gives in too easily. Some are of the opinion that the presidential palace has become the decisionmaking center. They stress the role of Andrzej Majkowski, a former activist of the Union of Socialist Youth [ZMS], who headed an MSZ department when Krzysztof Skubiszewski was minister and currently plays a leading role at the Presidential Chancellery. He is alleged to be supported by Marek Siwiec [in charge of foreign affairs at the Presidential Chancellery], who once had disclosed his own ambitions of heading the MSZ.

On the other hand, it is being said that the presidential office is also too passive about the employment policy and that the real decisionmaking center is located near Jozef Oleksy. That is where most of the candidates are said to be chosen. They are then fought over in battles between the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party, headed by Waldemar Pawlak. Rumor has it that decisions on diplomatic nominations largely depend on the authors of a notorious report prepared two years ago. It contained a combination of fact and crude gossip and was intended to humiliate the personnel decisions made by Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

Stinking Ambassador

Whatever happened to the idea of establishing a professional and competent Polish diplomatic corps that would be uninvolved in the current political setups? The concept was formulated six years ago. Even two years ago it was projected that the reform of the MSZ would be a precursor of change in the entire state administration in Poland, setting an example for ministerial structures in which the civil service would be separated from the top officials who are replaced every time the government changes. Great hopes were placed in the people employed during the Solidarity era. They were supposed to return to headquarters and create a real professional diplomatic corps together with seasoned diplomats tested in the new reality.

It is said at the MSZ that lower-ranking cadres are actually coming back and trying to find their place in the ministry, counting on a tedious but effective carrier in diplomacy. Very young people, not burdened with a controversial past, are joining. It is difficult, however, to name even one successful Polish ambassador who would agree to work at the MSZ upon returning from abroad with the prospect of being sent out again a couple of years. Neither Janusz Reiter (Germany) nor Jerzy Lukaszewski (Paris) nor Jan Kulakowski (EC) agreed.

The decisive factor for such decisions is undoubtedly the atmosphere of waiting for personnel changes that is felt in the MSZ. Will appointments of deputy ministers be the outcome of the division of political spoils? Will the politically invoked purge reach the level of department heads at the MSZ? Mundane issues also play a role—for example, money. The state can offer a department head a salary of over 10 million [old] zlotys. This is not attractive even to fresh university graduates speaking two foreign languages and with knowledge of the world because in Warsaw they can find dozens of better offers.

Under the circumstances, the Polish diplomatic service is forced to look for honored citizens willing to take on the mission of representing their country abroad. Former Minister Olechowski claims that this is an absolute anachronism in the modern world.

Piotr Marciniak has a somewhat more cautious opinion on this: "There are missions where a professional diplomat would do just fine, but others require deeper political experience."

All of our interlocutors agree that the worst possible method of constructing a diplomatic corps is sending proven political or personal friends to foreign diplomatic missions either to reward their accomplishments or to provide them with a hideout where they could wait for better times. Such "parachuting" methods were the specialty of PRL diplomacy. They were very thoroughly documented and seemed discredited once and for all. The method of selecting candidates for ambassadorial positions from private telephone listings of politically influential people stirred strong reaction in the 1990's. The war for ambassadorial positions fought between the coalition parties is equally embarrassing.

According to a high-ranking MSZ official, the only solution would be to introduce one more informal custom that is commonly practiced worldwide: that of confidential talks between representatives of the president and the opposition over prospective candidacies. "This would enable us to avoid candidates that appear to be political provocations and incite national debates," he says. "The intention is not to hide anything from the public. An ambassador who stinks from a political war waged over his appointment is not credible from the start."

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Poland: Political Groups Present Themselves on Internet

WS0508134096 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 5 Aug 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Zbigniew Wasik: "Sailing Through Polish Cyberspace; Politics on the Internet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Internet is the world's largest computer network; it enables tens of millions of users to connect with each other. In the Internet one can find information concerning practically all areas—from scientific libraries, economic, financial, and technological data bases to computer games and thousands of gratuitous programs. Also, the Internet is not free of politics.*

A Pole who is making his first steps as an internaut (this is how Internet fans call themselves) may conclude that a considerable portion of the information found on the Internet is political and that the color of the information is easily recognizable. A few political parties have already recognized the huge capabilities of the Internet. One of the parties that has its pages on the Internet is the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], which is natural if one recalls PSL Chairman Waldemar Pawlak's interest in computers. Other parties that have Internet pages are the Union for Real Politics [UPR], the Union of Labor [UP], and the Freedom Union [UW].

The PSL is probably the party whose Internet page has been prepared better than others. It offers nearly all of the information concerning the party; this is a nice surprise in the case of the Peasants, who are rather reluctant to offer any information about themselves. Through the Internet, they provide information not only about the central leadership, but also about their regional structures.

Internet users also can find out quite a lot about UPR. For example, they can become familiar with the draft constitution drawn up by Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, as well as with the basic documents of the party.

Also, UP has gone to great lengths to present as much information about itself as possible, although Ryszard Bugaj's party carefully conceals certain things, which, incidentally, are widely known. Thanks to the so-called links (references to other pages on the Internet), users of the network can also find information about other left-wing parties in the world.

When we come to the UW page, all we can read is the following: "Some more patience, please." Therefore, we keep surfing through Polish cyberspace and reach an "interesting place." An activist of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], who signs as the "Old KPN Campaigner," informs extensively about "crimes" committed by the communists and postcommunists and accuses the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] of just about everything—from causing bad crops to exterminating the Sumatra tiger.

An important place on the page edited by the "Old KPN Campaigner" is occupied by bio notes on [KPN leaders] Leszek Moczulski and Krzysztof Krol. Then comes the special attraction of the page. The Silesian KPN activist saw to it that internauts had something nice to look at. Most certainly as additional proof of the "crimes" committed by the governing coalition, it presents a collection of photographs of young ladies who are so poor they cannot afford to buy even pants.

Internauts also have access to the most recent information on what is going on in the Sejm, the Senate, and the government. They can find a press review made by Radio ESKA; they can see what the latest issues of RZECZPOSPOLITA, TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, and SLOWO-DZIENNIK KATOLICKI deal with. They also can find out what the regular programs broadcast by Radio Maryja are, become familiar with the text of the Concordat, and read jokes about mothers-in-law, the Polish United Workers Party, the Polish People's Republic, Yeltsin, and communism.

However, unless this is included in the pages on the Office of the Council of Ministers or of the parliament, they will not find out anything about the activities of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic or the SLD. Of course, they can look at the SLD's activities through the eyes of the "Old KPN Campaigner," but this is not the best way to do it.

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Romania: PS President Views Possible Electoral Alliances

AU0308164196 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 29 Jul 96 p 3

[Interview with Tudor Mohora, president of the Socialist Party, by Mihai Radulescu; place and date not given: "The Socialist Party Will Formulate an Offer for Parties Interested in Concluding an Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Radulescu] Mr. Mohora, the elections are knocking on the door. Does the Socialist Party [PS] consider, as other similarly young parties probably do as well, that it could increase its chances by establishing an alliance?

[Mohora] Of course, we also think, as other parties do, that we have to choose between two variants: either go ahead on our own, or strike an alliance. Backing the first variant is the fact that we obtained 2.7 percent of the votes for the local councils [in the recent municipal elections]. A further reason: For the time being it is much more important for our party to assert its personality than find shelter inside an alliance. The latter variant could, indeed, ensure some seats for us in parliament, but it would not allow us to present our political program in the best way we could.

[Radulescu] It is quite obvious that alliances require the granting of certain concessions. However, as anyone can see, granting concessions has become quite fashionable....

[Mohora] We bear in mind the alternative of an alliance, but things have to be considered in a nuanced way. There do exist alliances or declarations about intentions to establish such alliances that are not based on serious negotiations. The PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], for instance, one week considers joining a liberal alliance, but a week later sets up a "new center" with the PUR [Romanian Humanist Party—reference to the recently established National Center Union].

The PS has received offers from several political parties, most of which are of a center-left orientation. Some of these offers have even been made public, such as those coming from the USD [Social-Democratic Union], the PRM [Greater Romania Party], the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], or the Pensioners Party. But these offers were not followed by concrete negotiations, so they solely indicate the aforementioned parties' readiness to strike an alliance with the PS. Currently we are engaged in negotiations with certain nonparliamentary left-wing parties, and we might soon announce some mergers.

[Radulescu] The way I see it, as far as this issue is concerned, the PS has so far acted in a quite passive way. Can it afford to go on doing so?

[Mohora] As far as we are concerned, I do not believe we can take the initiative, with the offers coming from us. [as published] And the reason for that is our lucidity and realism, because in politics one cannot talk about modesty, not in Romania at least. So far we have abstained from proposing the principles of any alliance, which, obviously, has to be a left-wing one. However, considering the interest manifested lately by several political parties, especially ones that are not represented in parliament, we are considering making an offer. Soon we will formulate and publish the fundaments and the objectives suiting our political orientation, on the basis of which we will then engage in negotiations with the parties and other organizations of civil society that show interest in us. You are right, so far we have adopted a wait-and-see policy. The decision I mentioned is to be made soon, by the national council of our party. The majority trend in our party is, however, against striking alliances.

[Radulescu] There is a great deal of talk about the necessity of achieving the unity of the left wing. Insistent appeals are being launched to that effect. There is no doubt that yours is a left-wing party. Don't you think they mean you? Don't you feel responsible for the current fragmentation of the left-wing zone of the political spectrum?

[Mohora] First I would like to point out that those who are calling for left-wing unity should first clearly define which parties they consider in the left wing. If you ask me, I would say that from the point of view of their doctrines, this category should include the social democratic and socialist parties, including the most radically left-wing ones, such as those representing the peasants, the laborers, and so on. Those who call for the salvage of the left wing's chances, as a response to the quite obvious regrouping and offensive of the right wing, should not avoid tackling the issue of who bears responsibility for the current paradoxical situation of the left wing: The opinions of the vast majority of our citizens are shifting toward the left, while the popularity of the "traditional" left-wing parties is diminishing. We do not feel responsible for the current situation of the left wing, but we certainly do so for its future. That is why we will not make the same mistake, as others did, who accepted concessions to our principles and ideals, because that could affect our future.

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Romania: PUNR Spokesman: Alliance With CDR Possible

AU0508161696 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 2 Aug 96 p 6

[Interview with PUNR Spokesman Mircea Valcu by Cristina Wlassopol; place and date not given: "The PUNR Could Strike an Alliance With the CDR, but Solely To Govern the Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wlassopol] Mr. Mircea Valcu, should the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] win the elections in the autumn without obtaining an absolute majority in Parliament, would the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] agree to set up an alliance with it to form a new government?

[Valcu] Any such agreement on our participation in coalition governments has first to be passed by the PUNR National Council and I do not know what decision they would make in such a case. In my personal opinion, the PUNR could set up an alliance with the CDR, but solely to govern the country.

[Wlassopol] Do you want a PUNR alliance with the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] to be set up after the elections?

[Valcu] I would not comment on that, as it depends on the situation that the PDSR will be facing after the elections.

[Wlassopol] What plans have the PUNR worked out for the elections this autumn?

[Valcu] I believe that we will exceed the percentage that we reached in the previous elections, when we obtained 8 percent of the vote. We are not worried about the elections! I believe that we will obtain between 8 and 10 percent of the vote, although some of my colleagues think that we will obtain even more than that. I suppose I am less emotional than they are in the way in which I judge things, and therefore my assessments are more balanced than theirs.

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Federal

FRY: Minister, Belgian Envoy Discuss Slavonia, Baranja, Srem

LD0508175496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1740 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 5 (TANJUG)—Minister in the Yugoslav Government Margit Savovic and Belgian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Jan Mattysen noted here on Monday there were similarities in the Yugoslav and Belgian analyses of the situation in the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem.

Mattysen delivered Savovic, minister in charge of ethnic minorities' human freedoms and rights in the Yugoslav Government, a message from Queen Fabiola of Belgium, the Yugoslav information secretariat said.

The statement said Mattysen especially inquired during the talk about the humanitarian situation in the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem in which Belgians are soon to take over command over the international force.

The Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem is the only remaining part of the former Republic of Serb Krajina not occupied by Croatian troops in their armed attacks on its western and southern parts in May and August last year. In the attacks, Croatian troops expelled 250,000 Serbs who went mainly to Yugoslavia and the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem.

The region, predominantly populated by Serbs, is situated between Yugoslavia and Croatia and was placed under the one-year transitional administration (UNTAES) [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] late in November last year with a possibility to extend the mandate by another year.

The statement said Savovic pointed in the talk to the need to define by law—while the U.N. force is still present in the region—all domains of life of Serbs in Croatia, to guarantee them human freedoms and all civil rights, including property rights.

Savovic assessed that only by creating perspectives for normal life and work, refugees will return to their homes without fears of discrimination and fresh conflicts. Mattysen thanked for extensive information and set out that the Belgian Government would help Yugoslavia reintegrate into international institutions as soon as possible, the statement said.

The statement said Savovic and Mattysen exchanged views on the results of a conference of Balkan women on peace in the Balkans recently held in Brussels.

Savovic thanked Belgian Government for organizing the conference in which she also took part at the head of the Yugoslav delegation and expressed hope that Belgium would continue playing an unbiased role in the peace process in the Balkan region.

FRY: Declaration on Protection of Rights of Serbs From Croatia

LD0508173696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1720 GMT 5 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 5 (TANJUG)—The problem of Serbs from the Republic of Croatia (R.H.) is a priority Serb national and state question, and consequently we demand that the Serbs in that former Yugoslav republic should regain their political rights of which they had been deprived in a non-democratic way.

This is said in a declaration on the defence and protection of the national interests and human rights of the Serb people in Croatia. The declaration was made Monday by the Association of Serbs from the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and the Republic of Croatia (R.H.) in Belgrade.

The RSK is the state formed by Serbs towards the beginning of 1991 in their ethnic and historical territories within the administrative boundaries of Croatia following Zagreb's forcible secession from the former Yugoslavia.

In only two armed aggressions of the Croatian forces in May and August of last year, 250,000 Serbs were driven out of the western and southern parts of the one-time RSK, while around 4,000 more Serbs were either killed or missing.

The Croatian authorities not only do not allow the return of those escaped or expelled to their homes but even continue to Tsekov those remaining, primarily the elderly and the sick, who stayed to live there.

"The current humanitarian, economic and political position of the expelled and escaped (is) tragic and uncertain," says the reason why this declaration was made. It is added that the association holds that the full autonomy of Serbs must be instituted in the ethnic Serb space in Croatia.

The association demands that the international community, especially the Hague tribunal, should ascertain individual guilt for the crimes committed against the Serb people from 1990 to this date.

"In the cities of the R.H. in which, until six years earlier, the Serbs were a majority, we demand the opening of

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information centres and offices for human rights of the E.U. (European Union), modelled after an information centre that has been opened by the United States in Pristina (centre of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija)," the association pointed out.

At the same time, the association addressed on Monday an acute protest against the Croatian Government's decision to settle the Croats from Janjevo, a locality in Kosovo and Metohija, in Kistanje, a locality not far from Knin in the former RSK.

The populating of Kistanje, plundered and devastated during the Croatian armed operation "Storm," with the Croats from Janjevo "about whom lies are disseminated that they had been ousted by the Yugoslav authorities, have been understood by refugees and expelled from Kistanje as one more cynical example of how the Croatian authorities are doing their utmost to render impossible the return of the refugees and the expelled to their homes," it is said in the announcement by the association.

FRY: Possibility of Indicted Colonel's Assassination Examined

AU0508122796 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 7

[Article by V.J.: "Is Sljivancanin's Assassination Being Prepared?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to MONITOR's sources, who have directly contacted the so-called Yugoslav Army's Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin, this officer asked in July to be received by General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff.

Col. Sljivancanin demanded from the chief a more complete answer regarding his position in light of rumors that he might be extradited to the tribunal in The Hague.

Our sources claim that, on that occasion, Gen. Perisic told him that he was not in a position to offer any extensive answer and that the decision was to be made on a political level. On the other hand, Gen. Perisic acquainted Col. Sljivancanin with data collected and assessments made by the military security service saying that there is a realistic possibility of Sljivancanin's assassination on the territory of Serbia. Perisic advised Sljivancanin to take care of himself and his safety. Since then the indicted colonel has been regularly going to a Belgrade firing range, practicing shooting with a handgun.

Our sources describe Sljivancanin as "very nervous, on the verge of panic."

FRY: Justice Minister Krivokapic on Cooperation With UN

AU0208201396 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 96 p 2

[Interview with Dr. Vladimir Krivokapic, federal minister of justice, by T.M. Tomasevic; place and date not given: "There Will Be No Extradition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yugoslavia and the United Nations will soon sign an agreement on opening a Belgrade-based liaison office for the Hague Tribunal. The text of this document, after being discussed and modified accordingly at UN headquarters, is currently being finalized by the Federal Government.

Explaining the substance of these talks and the future agreement in an interview with VECERNJE NOVOSTI, Dr. Vladimir Krivokapic, federal justice minister, pointed out that the UN officials had complied with Yugoslav demands to a considerable extent.

"The Federal Government representatives visited UN Headquarters in New York City from 10 to 15 July," Krivokapic said. "We discussed the text of the agreement and the functions of the liaison office in Belgrade, and we worked out the most important details regarding its inevitable opening."

[Tomasevic] What functions will the Belgrade liaison office perform?

[Krivokapic] The basis for Yugoslavia's cooperation with the Hague Tribunal is UN Security Council Resolution 827, passed in 1993. This resolution obliges all states on the territory of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] to cooperate with this court in accordance with its statute. The view of the international community has always been that the Tribunal was created in keeping with the provisions of the UN Charter and that our country, along with all other countries, members of this organization, is obliged to implement this Security Council resolution.

Arbitration Commission

[Tomasevic] So far, more than 10 countries have passed special regulations on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, among them, the United States, Germany, and France... They are not obliged to extradite their citizens to the Tribunal because their own laws do not permit that. What are Yugoslavia's obligations?

[Krivokapic] Our obligation stems, among other things, from our unfavorable international position and from the Dayton and Paris agreements. An issue that remains open is the request that we conform our legislation to the provisions of the Hague Tribunal's statute. Among

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other things, this involves the right of the prosecutor to require the concession of a criminal procedure or the right to ask for a retrial even after the verdict has been passed. Changing laws, however, is a very complicated procedure, so conforming our local legislation to the provisions of the Tribunal is out of the question. At last week's talks with representatives of the United Nations, upon our initiative, it was agreed that all the unresolved issues should be settled through arbitration.

An international arbitration commission will be formed to seek a compromise between the request made by the Tribunal and what our own laws prescribe. The arbitration should decide only about purely legal issues, since in certain cases we can have one view, and the Tribunal can have another.

[Tomasevic] What about extradition? Will the arbitration commission also decide about that?

[Krivokapic] No, it will not. The provisions of the federal Constitution and Law on Criminal Procedures must be observed. Article 17 of the Constitution of the FRY says explicitly that citizens of the FRY cannot be extradited to another country, regardless of all the Tribunal's mandatory decisions.

[Tomasevic] What if a citizen of the Serb Republic, accused of war crimes, crosses into Yugoslavia?

[Krivokapic] In such cases the decisive factor will be his citizenship—whether he is a citizen of the FRY or not.

[Tomasevic] Does that mean that in keeping with the Hague Tribunal's indictment, our government could arrest and extradite such a person if he is not a Yugoslav citizen?

[Krivokapic] It depends on the documentation the Tribunal would send us in each individual case. If it is complete and contains all that is prescribed by the Tribunal's statute, and if it is in keeping with our local laws, then our authorities could apprehend such a person. But I repeat, every individual case will be dealt with separately. As for conditions under which foreign citizens can be extradited, in other words, individuals who do not have Yugoslav citizenship are also regulated by our criminal procedure law, which explicitly lists all the conditions under which it can be done.

Rights of Liaison Office

[Tomasevic] What rights will the members of the liaison office have?

[Krivokapic] The Yugoslav delegation at the talks in New York insisted that the agreement also include the application of provisions contained in the UN 5th Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 1946, which the liaison office members will have to observe. In other words, they will not have unlimited rights here. I would like to remind you that this Convention anticipates cooperation between the host state and the secretary general when an official of this organization, in this case a member of the liaison office, abuses his privileges. Cooperation with the Yugoslav authorities will be conducted through the Republic Justice Ministry and will be "sent down" to our courts, when, for example, someone has to be placed in custody. Such measures will always be conducted with the consent and under the control of our authorities. No foreign individual or organization can undertake any measures in Yugoslavia that concern the rights and freedoms of its citizens unless it is in keeping with our laws and under the control of our authorities.

[Tomasevic] Will similar branch offices of the Hague Tribunal also be opened in the former Yugoslav republics?

[Krivokapic] Yes, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. But the difference is that there they have material evidence of crimes, while in Yugoslavia such evidence does not exist. Here the liaison office members will have to gather testimonies from people in order to determine the facts. Every citizen who is currently in the FRY and is willing to testify can come to the liaison office. The office will mostly work on discovering crimes against Serbs committed on territories where the war was fought.

[Tomasevic] Will the Federal Government begin to send to the Hague Tribunal the reports of the Committee for War Crimes on genocide committed against the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia?

[Krivokapic] The government will soon make a decision on that.

[Tomasevic] Two years ago the Muslim government in Sarajevo initiated a lawsuit against Yugoslavia with the permanent International Court of Justice in The Hague. What has happened since that time?

[Krivokapic] The Federal Government is preparing a countersuit in which it not only denies and disputes the accusations according to which Yugoslavia helped the Serbs in the Serb Republic commit genocide against the Muslims, but it also gives factual and documented evidence that it was just the other way around: that genocide was committed against the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Representatives of the Federal Government are currently in The Hague to work out additional procedures and deadlines for submitting the countersuit.

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Penal Code

[Tomasevic] The Federal Justice Ministry is preparing around 15 new laws, including the Penal Code. Where do we stand?

[Krivokapic] For the first time this penal code will be unique for the entire country. The general section has been completed and our experts in criminal law are working on the special section. The entire job should be completed in the first half of next year.

[Tomasevic] According to the current proposal, will the death penalty be abolished?

[Krivokapic] Discussion about the death penalty has been going on for the last 2,000 years, so we are also discussing it. Whatever I say now would be a prejudgement because the law is still in the working phase. The law does anticipate abolishing the death penalty, but as with everything else, there are arguments to the contrary. We shall see what prevails. What is certain, though, is that we are heading toward democratization of our legislature, which is the intention of our entire society. In that framework it will be assessed whether or not the death penalty should be abolished.

[Tomasevic] At its last session, the Federal Assembly abolished a law on the basis of which the former SFRY had founded a number of museums, including the "Josip Broz Tito" Memorial Center. What will become of that?

[Krivokapic] The Federal Government will soon pass two decrees. The first will resolve the status of the Museum of Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia and the Memorial Center, and the other will control the use of buildings for formal and official state purposes. In this way, the entire Memorial Center complex in Uzicka 11-15 will be used by the federal authorities exclusively for formal and official purposes. There have been proposals that these buildings, among them the Oval building and the "Marsalat" [Tito's former office building], be placed at the disposal of the president of Yugoslavia. The White Palace and the Old Palace will continue to be used to accommodate foreign heads of state.

[Box, p 2]

Tito's Grave

[Tomasevic] What will become of Tito's grave? Will it be moved?

[Krivokapic] The Federal Government has not yet discussed that.

[Box, p 2]

Villas for Rent

[Tomasevic] What happened to the villas that were formerly used by the former SFRY republics—the "Villa Bosnia," "Villa Slovenia," and those in Dobanovci and Karadjordjevo?

[Krivokapic] Most of the villas formerly used by officials of the former SFRY republics have been rented. Some, however, have been returned to their previous owners, for instance, the Savski venac municipal authorities. When the rental agreements with Yugoslav Railways, Simpo [furniture company], CIP [Transportation and Communications Institute], and the PTT [post, telegraph, and telephone] expire, the villas at Uzicka Street 7a, 20, or 25 will have the status of buildings for formal and official purposes. As for the facilities located outside Belgrade—in Dobanovci, Karadjordjevo, and the villa "Omorika" on Mt. Tara—they too will be used by the federal administration, which will be responsible for their maintenance.

Serbia

Serbia: Article Describes U.S. Offices in Belgrade, Pristina

AU0508123796 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by Dejan Stanojlovic: "Renovating the Truth"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At soon as you approach the entrance to the building on the corner of Cika Ljubina and Knez Mihailova Streets, once well known for its spacious display window with pictures and photographs from U.S. political life, a notice on the door will tell you that the center is closed for renovation.

Only an Excuse

Is it possible that the United States, the most powerful country on the planet and the leader of the new world order, which thinks that not a single problem in the world can be resolved without it, cannot finish an ordinary paint job in one year? Or is the renovation just an excuse?

Accidentally or intentionally, the cultural center of the United States in Belgrade stopped all ongoing work last year, on the eve of the military intervention against the Republic of Serb Krajina and the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs carried out by the Western allies led by the United States.

At the same time, a new information center was opened in Pristina, in Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija]. As if the

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role of this institution were finished in Belgrade and the relay baton taken up by the branch in Pristina.

"We feel that the role of the U.S. cultural center in Belgrade is not finished. Its functions have been changed and tranfered to the the Information-Reference Center (in the U.S. Embassy building) for financial and technical reasons. Moreover, a part of the building at 19, Cika Ljubina Street will be opened in the fall as the library of the cultural center," John Brown, counselor for press u e of the U.S. Embassy, said.

According to Brown, the new Information-Reference Center [IRC], which recently moved to the U.S. Embassy building (46, Kneza Milosa), provides computer access to information about the United States to all persons who are professionally interested.

"Due to limited space, visits can only be made by appointment, but the necessary information can also be obtained by telephone. The IRC will answer those questions as well as it can," John Brown said.

It is obvious, therefore, that the possibilities of the IRC will be significantly limited in the future, as they are now for that matter, because the embassy building has much less space for all those who would like to get firsthand information about the United States. Priority will be given to certain researchers, journalists, and business representatives. Our impression is that the IRC will provide much more business information than information about culture and politics.

In well-informed diplomatic circles, the "temporary" closing of the U.S. cultural and information center is identified with the direct engagement of the United States on the side of the Muslim-Croat coalition in the Bosnian war.

Because the Center was closed, very little information about the United States arrived here. Academicians, research scholars, journalists, interested politicians, and many others were deprived of information on the basis of which they could find out about the attitude of the United States to Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Through the "Back Door"

Surely it would have been possible to get a much better idea about the intentions of the United States toward the Serbs if people had been able to go to the U.S. information center and read the contents of all those talks that so many U.S. negotiators had conducted and are still conducting about Serbia and in Serbia, beginning with Frasure, then Holbrooke, and finally Kornblum.

As things are, from now on, all this information will be available only to a closer circle of our citizens. One *cannot exclude the possibility of people being selected,* by the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade of course, on the basis of some special criteria of desirability. In this way, selective infomation giving is introduced through the "back door," which is contrary to the U.S. laws on freedom of the press.

The new role of the U.S. information center in Belgrade will give our people insufficient knowledge about the U.S foreign policy that is being implemented here and in the entire Balkans—particularly in Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

Also, the reduced role of the center in Belgrade and the increasingly greater role of the center in Pristina is particulalry perplexing when one considers that the greatest number of users of those services are in Belgrade, where 20 percent of our scientific community lives and works.

It appears that after the economic sanctions, citizens of Yugoslavia will also have to undergo isolation in the sphere of culture and infomation.

[Box, p 5]

Peace Dividends

The end of the Cold War, from which the United States emerged as the winner over the USSR, or Russia, has contributed in many ways to changes in the pattern of organization of U.S. institutions on the territory of other countries.

Last year Republican Newt Gingrich proposed to Congress to abolish the United States Information Agency, the USIA, (in order to cut down on budget expenditures) in U.S. embassies throughout the world and, with this, all the information centers. The justification for that proposal was that the Cold War had ended and it was finally time to reap the "peace dividends."

The United States Information Agency was not abolished, but some of its activities were substantially reduced. So, for example, the center of the "Voice of America" was moved from Munich to Prague because the Iron Curtain had fallen and Munich was no longer on the border with the Eastern Bloc.

The need to publish the magazine "Problems of Communism" also stopped, and a solution to financing certain USIA activities was found in selling them to people like George Soros, who bought "Voice of America" and who owns "Radio Free Europe." A similar solution was also found for many USIA research institutes.

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Kosovo

Kosovo: Arkan's 'Ominous' Visit to Province Recounted

AU0608102796 Tirana ATA in English 1743 GMT 5 Aug 96

[Report by Lindita Karadaku]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 5 (ATA)—Accompanied by scores of armed Serbs, Zeljko Raznjatovic, called Arkan, "visited" Kosova right after the recent incidents against Serbian police stations. Together with his paramilitary formations, he paraded on the streets of Prishtina and Podujeva.

The "visit" to Kosova of the chairman of the Party of Serbian Unity right after the recent incidents is an ominous warning which shows that Kosova is part of the strategy of "tigers," paramilitary militiamen led by Arkan, authors of the massacres of 1991 in Eastern Slavonia and in 1992 in the eastern area of Bosnia. The warning becomes more ominous with the region full of Serbian soldiers, policemen and military arsenal, and on the basis of the fact that the task of "the tigers" is to "purge" what remains after the actions of the Serbian army in the suburbs and villages.

Before the war in Yugoslavia, Arkan was a bandit and an ordinary criminal sentenced with 20 years of imprisonment for theft, deceit and bank robbery, wanted by the Interpol of seven countries. Time and again he has warned that he "will deal" with the question of Kosova. As a "deputy" of Kosova to the Serbian parliament, he has demanded that professional forces be installed on the borders with Albania. In July this year, Arkan "forecast" that broad conflicts may burst in Kosova in the coming year. This "forecast" has been made along his "visits" and those of his men to various places of Kosova.

Arkan, wanted by the International Court of the Hague for crimes during the war in former Yugoslavia, will take part in the coming parliamentary elections in Serbia.

Serbian sources have declared frequently that Arkan "will start [to] eliminate Albanians physically." Serbian paper JEDINSTVO said that Arkan has threatened the Albanians with their expulsion from Kosova. The paper cites Arkan in a news conference in Peja, near the border with Albania, to have said that his party "will be committed to make all the Albanians not loyal to the Serbian state leave Kosova."

The presence of Arkan and paramilitary forces in Kosova is part of the strategy of Milosevic to fight in Kosova by all manner of means. Since June 1989, on occasion of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Fushe-Kosova, Milosevic warned: "Today, after 600 years, we are again at war, this has not yet come to arms, but an armed struggle may also be a reality in the future."

Kosovo: Latest Attacks on Police Stations Depicted

LD0508183996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1831 GMT 5 Aug 96

["Pool" item by Djorde Jevtic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Aug 5 (TANJUG)—The latest terrorist attacks last Friday on four police stations in four villages in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) were fifth in a series of synchronized planned attacks on the police this year, carried out as a rule at night or during a week-end.

The attacks were perpetrated in the Podujevo municipal area, ill-famed for the extremism of Albanian separatists for a decade.

Albanian extremists, suspected perpetrators of the attacks, have carried out hundreds of assaults on Serbian police officers in the past six years since the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia fully established its authority in Kosmet.

A strong separatist movement of ethnic Albanians (the most numerous minority in Yugoslavia) has been active for decades in Kosmet, seeking the province's secession from Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its unification with neighboring Albania.

Albanian separatist strategists often abandon their propaganda and media campaigns aimed at convincing the world of their alleged peaceful intentions to undertake radical actions and turn to classical terrorism. They do so every time when important moves are expected or when they feel a loss of credibility of their attempts to convince the world that conditions in Kosmet are dramatic.

Accordingly, the latest attack occurred only a few days after Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic visited Kosmet and stated that a policy of peace was being followed in the province, that Kosmet was an inalienable part of Serbia and that the integrity of the republic cannot be brought into question.

Friday's attacks were aimed mainly at nullifying the political and psychological effects of Marjanovic's statements and at telling the world that there can be no peace in the Balkans until the aspirations of Albanian secessionists to a "state of Kosovo" are fulfilled.

The extremism of Albanian separatists came to the fore especially in 1991, when civil war broke out in the

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former Yugoslavia. According to official figures, threre were 119 assaults on police officers or officials that year, 23 of them with weapons.

In 1993, year of the greatest escalation of the war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the frequency of terrorist attacks rose again. Fire was opened on police officers a dozen times and several incidents were registered at Yugoslav-Albanian border, the most drastic case being an ambush of a police vehicle in which two police officers were killed and five wounded.

A two-year lull followed, but as peace in Bosnia became imminent and especially after the Dayton Accord was signed, terrorist actions in Kosmet were resumed.

Several illegal extremist Albanian organizations are behind such terrorist actions, some of which have publicly claimed responsibility for them.

The leading Albanian groupings in Kosmet have never publicly admitted to extremism and terrorism or voiced their condemnation of such actions, although the Albanian press openly carried admissions of terrorist acts by militant organizations.

Experts on Albanian separatist movement believe that its strategists will continue combining the tactics of "peacemaking" and terrorism in order to make at least some of their ambitious promises to their followers come true.

Kosovo: Albanian Official Interviewed on Situation in Province

AU0508084696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 7

[Interview with Skeljzen Malici, "Albanian philosopher and publicist," by Izabela Kisic; place and date not given: "Belgrade Is Losing Ground"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Currently, everything is quiet in Kosovo. Silent 'underground' negotiations are under way in preparation for the Albanian-Serb talks. Rugova has confirmed that they are working on that. We can probably expect that the Serb side will loosen its pressure, which would enable the dialogue to begin.

"According to diplomatic sources, Belgrade agreed over a month ago to fulfill at least two conditions—to release political prisoners and educational facilities. However, Belgrade has withdrawn that decision and left these issues to be resolved as part of the talks," Skeljzen Malici, from the Pristina branch of the Open Society Fund, told NASA BORBA correspondents.

[Kisic] Are these talks connected with the visit of Kornblum or U.S. Congressman Eliot Engel to Kosovo?

[Malici] They are not the only ones who are working on that. Perhaps Bildt's team and the diplomatic missions are also playing their part. There is speculation that there are several parallel lines. Most of the speculation is connected with the Americans, who have opened a culture and information center, but it may also be that Germany and even some Scandinavian countries are also working to facilitate these talks. These talks are not direct, they will probably be conducted by shuttle diplomacy.

[Kisic] Is the Albanian side willing to negotiate if the mentioned conditions are fulfilled—the release of political prisoners and schools?

[Malici] Yes, but they want good mediation. That is the key issue. Some kind of diplomatic catch is sought that would allow both sides to interpret the mediation of the third side the way they want, with the consent of the mediator.

[Kisic] What are the reactions in Kosovo to Despic's statement made in the SANU [Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences]?

[Malici] There are no euphoric statements. Everyone is following that with great attention, including the local media. The commonest remark is that the Serbs have finally sobered up. The departure point is that Belgrade is losing ground in Kosovo, and, since it had invested a lot in Bosnia and had an internal crisis, it can no longer invest in Kosovo. Perhaps they will not let go of all of Kosovo at once, so that is why they are looking for a solution by dividing it.

[Kisic] What are the positions of JUL [Yugoslav Left] in Kosovo?

[Malici] JUL has been trying to penetrate into Kosovo lately. They may have some people here and there. For the time being, they do not have very many public promotions, and their last few promotions have not been too successful. They have not attracted a single Albanian of consequence. A year ago, they called me from the Party of Yugoslavs—a member of the JUL. I told them that I was not interested, and I asked them to give my regards to Ljusa (Ljubisa Ristic), my colleague from our university days, whom I had not seen for a long time. They called others too.

In any event, the JUL did carry a demagogic note toward the Albanians. For example, their posters were printed in Albanian, like in the old communist times. That is, however, a masquerade, and no one took them seriously.

[Kisic] What, in your mind, should Kosovo be like?

[Malici] In these present circumstances, when the entire Balkans are being partitioned, I would like Kosovo

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to gain full independence and even to associate with Albania. However, that is a complicated process. I am afraid of the traumas of division, primitive nationalisms that flourish in such circumstances and can create internal and external problems. If we could create an independent Kosovo, I would still not be in favor of an ethnic state. The United States is primarily trying to create a new balance in the Balkans. The relative concessions given to the Serbs regarding Bosnia will probably be compensated for in Kosovo. But this situation, in which nothing radical is happening, will probably continue for some time.

[Kisic] What is the role of the international community in Kosovo? There were rumors about a protectorate.

[Malici] The international community is present in various forms. A UN protectorate, however, would not pass easily, because it would set a precedent for many similar demands. It is possible to make an agreement between some great powers, or for one of those powers to take upon itself the risk of feigning some kind of protectorate and, in that way, force a solution that would make both sides accept it. These are, for example, actions that the European Union could undertake.

I do not know whether a protectorate would be workable, because there is no international instrument for that. There is a procedure in international law for decolonization, but, in that case, it would be necessary first to proclaim colonial status for Kosovo. If an entirely new principle is chosen, there must be a consensus in the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

[Kisic] Are there still political conflicts among the Albanians in Kosovo?

[Malici] They existed up to May, and then they suddenly stopped, or remained at a very low intensity, due to the fundamental changes in the international environment, as well as in the local situation (the opening of the information center, Despic's statement...). This suddenly removed credibility from Rugova's opponents, for example Cosja, who have been clamoring that nothing was happening and that nothing has been achieved.

Rugova still has one more term and the possibility to do something, to begin and end the talks, regardless of their outcome. It rarely happens that someone who has the sole authority to negotiate is replaced during the negotiations.

[Kisic] What do you think about the Yugoslav opposition's appeal to the Albanians to vote at the elections?

[Malici] That is a hollow appeal. They have no contact whatsoever with Albanians, there is nothing in their program that would affect the Albanians nor the issue of Kosovo. They used to be even more radical than Milosevic, and we do not believe them. You must make a bridge and not force people to jump first.

[Kisic] What has the Albanian movement accomplished so far?

[Malici] It has created a great space for tolerance. Among the he Albanians, there is a high degree of self-organization, and there are even segments for the secession of Kosovo. Serbia is only keeping that under strategic control and is maintaining a constant level of repression. Every week they surround a new village, search for weapons, and arrest people, but they go no further than that, they do not want to provoke a war. I think that Belgrade is being careful to avoid applying extreme pressure that could create an explosion.

These forms of organization are the start of the institutionalized organization of the Albanians. Independent education and a very structured party network. The finance ministry, taxes, culture, and league sports, which we finance ourselves, are not key state functions, but they are the functions of a state.

It is often argued in favor of Rugova that, with these functions, the Albanians can create a state. Rugova recently told Radio Tirana that, by the year 2000, Kosovo could become a nice state. So, he could be the nice president of a nice state.

[Box, p 7]

War Suits No One

[Malici] If the catastrophic scenario according to which the war in the former Yugoslavia is shifting from one republic to another is true, then it could shift over into Serbia. I do not think that such a war would be fought in Kosovo, it is more likely that it would be a civil war in Serbia. The Kosovo war has other prerequisites, and if it ever occurs, it will be later. Perhaps it is the Albanians, and not the Serbs, who will start it. At this moment, neither the Albanians nor the Serbs want that war, Malici said.

Kosovo: ATA on Serb Media Debate on Division of Province

AU0208161396 Tirana ATA in English 1701 GMT 1 Aug 96

[Report by P. Tabaku: "Division of Kosova—A Juridically Groundless Offer of Compromise, Unacceptable for the Albanians"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 31 (ATA)—Recently the Serbian press has frequently presented ideas which are different in form but similar in essence

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with regard to the division of Kosova between the Serbs and the Albanians.

While this idea is supported as well as opposed among the Serbs, the Albanians refute it as a dangerous proposal that cannot be realised.

The academician Pavle Ivic (POLITIKA EKSPRES, 21 July) advocating the idea of the president of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, Aleksander Despic, for the secession of Kosova from Serbia, finds the realisation of this idea "in the peaceful ways and in justice" and recommends that "Serbs must have the territories in which historical monuments have been erected." Architect Branislav Kerst [name as received] goes even further in his book "Kosova Between Historical History and Ethnic Justice," in which he expresses openly the aims that "along cultural-historical monuments" Serbia should also have all the energy sources and mining riches.

But the academician Mihalio Markov [name as received], main former ideologist of the Socialist Party of Serbia, refutes this idea considering it a "capitulation and secession of Kosova" (POLITIKA EKSPRES, 22 Jul) Markov proposes as an easier solution "the procrastination of the solution of the Kosova question," defining a "20 year deadline for the reexamination of this question." The scholar Milan Andrijevic expresses the same viewpoint when he says that "this is an alternative which should be studied" and puts the question: "What will be divided, because along with political problems there are the economic problems as well."

Also Aleks Dragan has recently published a book which reflects the "worries" of the Serbian policy. The book is entitled "The Saga of Kosova" and reflects the idea of the division of Kosova between the Serbs and the Albanians. For the author the division of Kosova is "the only logical and realistic solution" which might offer Serbia the possibility "to save as many of its historical and cultural monuments as possible."

"The most sacred monastery for the Serbs," says the Albanian academician Mark Krasniqi, "is Trepca, the gold mine."

The reopening of this file at these moments in the Serbian Academy upon order of Belgrade in order to feel the pulse of the opinion and to prepare it for possible radical changes in Kosova, sounds as an offer for compromise on the part of the Serbian "democratic" forces.

"This is an 'old game' which has been played in 1920 in the Versailles Peace, in 1945 as well as several years ago also by the Yugoslav former president, academician Dobrica Cosic," says the President of Kosova, Ibrahim Rugova. [passage indistinct]

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